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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates how Community Policing (CP), as a global model of modern policing, is 
implemented in the urban periphery of La Paz in Bolivia. It identifies the yet not theorized concept, 
the global security scape, and addresses the changes in contemporary security provision such as the 
fragmentation and pluralisation of law enforcement. CP is understood as a technique of power that 
has become a global blueprint for action in contemporary security governance. In looking at how 
the policing model is transferred from the United Kingdom to Bolivia, based on British funding and 
expertise, the thesis argues that the top-down ‘best-practices’-approach utilized, building on global 
schemes of contemporary governmentality and responsibilization, has proved difficult to implement 
for the Bolivian Police. Despite good intentions and great expertise, the British collaboration has 
not safeguarded an effective, democratic and responsive communitarian sovereign police force, as it 
was intended. The policing philosophy builds on the inclusion of the community as an active role 
player in the provision of security that is to govern itself along a ‘culture of security’. As 
uncertainty towards the state and the police, among other factors, complicates a trustful relationship 
between the police and the public, a ‘parallel active community’ is established, the thesis concludes. 
Taking the space for action provided by the responsibilization mechanisms of the CP, the 
communities attempt to manage insecurity on their own in the grey zone between law and illegality. 
In this sense new claims to sovereignty are triggered. The thesis suggests that statehood and 
sovereignty should be understood as practices that are constantly (re)produced, negotiated, and 
contested by various formal and informal actors at all levels. Meaning that the boundaries of the 
state have become productive grey zones, in which the power of the state is both contested but also 
re-constituted on a perpetual basis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Global ideas on security structures and programmes are emerging around the world and have 
become embedded in local policies and practises in contemporary society. Security has in recent 
years changed from a focus on state security to the safety of people, in this thesis termed ‘citizen 
security’.1 These security concerns are highly pertinent in Latin America. During the last decade 
Latin American states have struggled with what has been called ‘an epidemic of violence’ that has 
resulted in the killing of more than 1 million Latin Americans through violent crime (UNDP 2013: 
v). This comes along with an increased perception of insecurity and an intensified focus on 
measures and strategies to counteract these (LAPOP 2014). Globally, the security sector has 
undergone profound changes, such as police reforms that have been furthered in order to overcome 
the severe challenges of violence and citizen insecurity (Ungar and Arias 2012; Garland 2001). This 
happens in a time when global and private organizations and networks have challenged the 
traditional idea of sovereignty, as being a safeguard to peace and order as long as it is possessed by 
the state. The influence of supra-national institutions has increased and there have been a range of 
privatizations of services that earlier were perceived as the sole responsibility of the state (Sassen 
2008; Goldsmith 2003). Instead, ‘non-state actors’ are increasingly taking over many of these 
responsibilities reconfiguring the way we understand state authority. 
 
New conceptualizations of sovereignty become prominent in particular when looking at citizen 
security and the use of violence to establish order, in the contemporary world (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011; Agamben 2000; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Dean 2010 just to mention a few key 
works). The changes do not necessarily mean that the power of the state has decreased, but it 
implies a transformation of how we should understand the state and its relation to its citizens 
(Agamben 2000; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). Similarly it also implies a shift in how we 
should understand civil society (Chatterjee 2004; Dean 2010; Rose 2000), performance of social 
control (Agamben 2000; Garland 2001; Newburn and Sparks 2004) and legal authority (Merry 
1992, Buur and Jensen 2004). The transformation of state authority means a transition of the state 
from being the (democratic) centre of power and order, in which the people is its (democratic) 
object of governance, to a more fragmented type of rule and government. This thesis’ investigation 
of how and who provides citizen security, in a context of a fragmentation of state authority in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Also termed ‘human security’ (Duffield 2005) 
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Bolivia, aims to complement to this literature. 
 
I intend to do so by incorporating Appadurai’s (1996: 32-33) notion of ‘global scapes’. Appadurai 
interprets globalization as worldwide connectedness through the idea of scapes. These cover a range 
of fields in which ideas, people, goods and technology move across the globe. The scapes are 
deeply perspectival constructs that take part in the formation of our social and cultural imagery of 
the world (Appadurai 1996; Powell and Steel 2011). This thesis proposes to add to Appadurai’s 
scapes what I call a global security scape, aiming to focus on the global travelling of ideas on 
security, and how these as ‘blueprints for action’ become translated into local settings.2 One of 
these global ideas of security governance is a certain model for policing that seeks to bring the 
police and the community closer together in safeguarding of law and order, which is what I, with 
this thesis, set out to investigate. 
 
Analysing community policing, this thesis addresses the reconfiguration of state authority as a 
consequence of changes within security governance globally and locally. The provision of security 
has tended to pluralize both within, on the frontiers of, and beyond state authority. This has partly 
happened as a result of official attempts to activate citizens in police work, but is also an expression 
of informal and ‘non-state’ initiatives (Loader 2000). Globally, Community Policing (hereafter CP) 
has been seen as one of the most prominent techniques for involving communities and citizens in 
the prevention of crime. In Bolivia, this policing model has been in the process of implementation 
since 2005. It has happened along an increased political focus on citizen security and a raising 
number of public and private security guards (LAPOP 2014). Despite of this, Bolivians still feel 
insecure (ibid.: 20). As Mary Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) has noted, there is not necessarily any 
direct relationship between the perception of risks and insecurity and actual dangerous events. In 
this thesis I explore how the perception of insecurity and the fear of crime can be constitutive for 
collective action on the frontiers of the state.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The closest I have come to a formulation of ‘security scape’ is the concept ‘governscapes’ by Finn Stepputat in a paper 
titled The Limits of Sovereignty presented at the SoSco workshop at Utrecht University 25-26 of April 2014. Here it is 
used in the discussion of sovereignty and security in Guatemala, however without any definition. I have therefore, for the 
purpose of this thesis, taken the liberty to use and delineate the term security scape as a new and yet not theorized 
concept. 
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Problem Area: A study of Policing in La Paz 
My starting point for studying actions on the frontier of the state will be an exploration of how the 
‘standardized’ model of CP gets transferred from the global level to the national level and how it 
becomes ‘translated’ into practice, in the urban periphery of the city of La Paz. The city is the place 
of the seat of government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. I will address how CP can be 
understood as a technique of policing that has become a blueprint for action within the global 
security scape. Security provision entails management of law and public order, and is, as 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) have argued, a special field, since the state is usually considered 
to be the sole legitimate public authority with the monopoly on force. Furthermore, the state has 
traditionally had the symbolic power to write laws and with this, the agency to define what is ‘law’, 
‘order’ and what is legitimate or illegitimate security concerns. For historical reasons, contemporary 
Bolivia suffers from severe problems with securing the rule of law. The justice system has very 
little support from the population (ONSC 2012: 20, LAPOP 2014: 14), in spite of the fact that the 
rather new State Constitution (CPE 2009) and the recent Law of Citizen Security (LCSSL 2012) 
promise equal access to justice for all Bolivians. Citizen security was in 2012 surveyed to be the 
biggest preoccupation among the Bolivian population and politicians (ONSC 2012), a tendency that 
is shared with the rest of the continent. To this comes that the police is the actor with the lowest 
rank in regards to public confidence in public institutions (LAPOP 2014: 14).  
 
In this context, CP has faced severe challenges along its way. Officially, the Bolivian government 
wants its citizens to be active participants in the performance of social control in line with the Law 
on Popular Participation and Social Control (LPCS 2013), the Citizen Security Law (LCSSL 2012) 
and the philosophy of Policía Comunitaria. Paradoxically, as the popular trust and support in state 
institutions are increasingly diminishing, diverging perceptions and ideas about ‘danger’ and 
‘security’ emerge. Providing a legitimate space for the ‘active citizens’ to get involved, CP in its 
current form in Bolivia, opens simultaneously for dilemmas in the intricate relation between 
vigilante-like self-policing and state provision of justice.  
 
This thesis asks how the global policing model of CP turns out to work in practice, in a country 
struggling with limited public resources and deeply held uncertainty towards the state’s capabilities 
to provide citizen security. In this, it explores how local barrio residents in the urban periphery of 
La Paz in part have taken the law into their own hands due to the lack of trust in the police. 
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Research Question 
How is community policing, as a global circulating security technique, being implemented in 
Bolivia and what does this tell us about 1) the translation of global security scapes into local 
contexts and practices and 2) how this triggers new claims to sovereignty?  
Structure of the Thesis 
In order to answer this overall question, the analysis is divided into four chapters, each answering 
an analytical question. In the following outline of the thesis I will present the analytical question 
attached to each chapter, as well as the argument(s) of the chapter. As I have been moving between 
inductive and deductive methods throughout the fieldwork and the process of writing, I have wished 
to make my arguments clear and use the chapter to discuss and substantiate the argument.  
 
In Chapter Two I will present my methodological reflections related to the fieldwork in Bolivia and 
the writing of the thesis. This will be followed by a presentation of the theoretical framework for 
the analysis (Chapter Three), including notions on the changes in global security, sovereignty, 
citizenship, security scapes and global transfers. It will present how the apparent movement away 
from the state is simultaneously reinforcing certain aspects of state authority, arguing that this is 
done in new fragmented ways.  
 
In the first part of the analysis (Chapter Four) I set out to answer the question: what characterizes 
the contemporary global security scape? The characterization is a product of my own combination 
of a range of theoretical and empirical contributions by other scholars. The chapter presents CP as a 
technique of power that both seeks to maintain state control and also decentralizes state control. The 
notions presented here will be utilized throughout the rest of the analysis.  
 
The next part of my analysis (Chapter Five) asks the question: How are global ideas brought to 
Bolivia through the transfer of CP? This chapter presents the formal translation of CP into the 
Bolivian security sector, by referring to literature on policy transfers and accounts from the field. In 
this chapter I will ask where the inspiration came from for implementing CP, who were the key 
actors in this transfer, and why these actors engaged in it in the first place? In an attempt at 
reconstructing the genealogy of CP in Bolivia, it will become clear how the transfer CP has not 
been implemented as it was intended. 
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Chapter Six and Seven both look at CP in practice, with different foci. Chapter Six sets out to 
answer the question: How has the actual implementation of CP shaped police practices, the 
police/community relationship and which implications does this have for performance of legitimate 
authority? It will present and analyse how the police force is working in a way where actual 
practices are quite different from the intensions of CP. It suggests that as the police are considered 
to be part of the creation of insecurity, and the responsibilization strategies have un-intended 
consequences, a space for action for Bolivian communities is opened, in the grey zone between law 
and illegality. 
 
The focus of Chapter Six creates the fluent transition to the focus on the community in Chapter 
Seven. Here the central question is: How does the community become ‘an active player’ in the 
provision of citizen security in a way that is different from what it was originally thought by the 
implementing actors of CP? It addresses how the poor implementation of CP creates the conditions 
for the emergence of grey zone between legal and illegal security practices, and explores how this 
blurry frontier becomes productive for local community action in the urban periphery of La Paz. In 
the chapter I argue that construction of ‘the community’ becomes a central strategy, parallel to CP, 
in managing insecurity for the barrio residents. The sovereignty of the state is in this sense 
contested as new sovereignty claims appear. 
 
Chapter Eight is a discussion that holds together the different themes that have been analysed 
throughout the thesis, and combines them with a few broader perspectives from other scholars. It 
discusses implications of transferring global ideas and ‘best-practices’ to local settings and what 
this means for state authority in contemporary society. Finally, the research question will be 
concluded upon in Chapter Nine.  
 
This thesis is based on perspectives from the Bolivian police and from barrio residents in the 
hillsides of La Paz, as they were presented to me through my fieldwork in! 2014, as well as 
theoretical and empirical perspectives from scholars who also deal with these topics. In the next 
Chapter I will present the fieldwork, the resulting data and utilized secondary material. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology  
 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted in La Paz during a period of four months, divided in 
two phases. In addition to interviews, meetings, workshops and informal talks I have also made use 
of a range of official and semi-official material given to me by my sources. The theoretical 
framework, as well as other empirical contributions on the topic set the frame for the analysis of my 
fieldwork, placing the local phenomenon that I have studied in Bolivia in a global context. This 
Chapter will lay out some of the many reflections I have had in the process of conducting the 
fieldwork, as well as the methodological choices made throughout the entire process. 
Levels of Fieldwork and the Resulting Data 
In order to understand the transfer and implementation of CP model locally, and its implications for 
local practice, I identified three overall levels that I based my fieldwork on. I was mostly interested 
in understanding practices and experiences as they are given meaning by the police on one side and 
the people on the other. In order to study their perspectives on their lived world, interviews seemed 
most suitable (Kvale 1995: 105). Furthermore, to understand the intentions and ideas behind CP, I 
needed documents and publications. Two interviews with what I call ‘transfer assistants’, who I 
also consider as experts, as well as participant observation at community meetings helped me put 
these perspectives in a context. The following will outline the three levels of fieldwork, and the data 
collected. 
  
The First level: Community Policing in Theory and at State Level 
At this level I set out to study what I call ‘the first translation’: from the global to the national, 
telling me about the Bolivian ‘official narrative’ and how this derives from global ideas. I 
conducted interviews with the Deputy of Higher Police Studies from the Bolivian Police, Colonel 
Ramiro Ruiz, who is responsible for internal and external training in CP. He was physically placed 
at the National head office of the Bolivian Police, at the department of planning and operations, in 
Sopocachi, La Paz. Colonel Ruiz also gave me around 1700 documents, of both official and semi-
official character, about the implementation of CP in Bolivia from 2005 to today. Ruiz is editor of 
guidelines and other official publications on Bolivia’s CP, material that I have also used in the 
analysis. At this level of my fieldwork I also conducted interviews with two experts: the first of 
these was Adriana Cordero, program coordinator at the British Embassy, who has the responsibility 
! 7!
of collaborating with the Bolivian Police, and has coordinated the support to CP. Cordero was able 
to give me official and semi-official publications, including evaluations and program papers of the 
project on CP. In addition, Cordero directed me to the Bolivian director of the Foundation 
Observatory for Security and Democracy, Loreta Tellería, who openly shared with me her 
knowledge and opinions about CP. These two interviews with the transfer assistants provide 
accounts from inside the field, based on knowledge and experiences from the implementation of 
CP. Cordero and Telleria can be considered experts by virtue of their professional position as both 
analytical observers of CP and authors of books and articles on CP. They possess ‘special 
knowledge’ and have been active participants in dealing with ‘the problem’ and its solution, which 
was the primary subject matter of the interviews (Meuser and Nagel 2009:24). We note, however, 
that the fine line between expert, layperson and ‘well-informed-citizen’ can be hard to draw, as 
Meuser and Nagel (ibid.) also address.   
 
Second level: the ‘official narrative’ in practice 
At this level I set out to explore the translation from the formal ideational level to the local police-
community interface. First, a visit to the Integrated Police Station (EPI) in Cotahuma gave me an 
idea of the police infrastructure and working routine. Also, a short meeting with the local colonel at 
the EPI gave me some intriguing insights into the current challenges faced by the colonel. The 
meeting included listening to complaints about her colleagues, and how the tiring election campaign 
has forced her to attend events that prevent her from doing her job as a colonel. Unfortunately she 
would not allow me to quote her for it, and she did not agree to meet me again even though I 
contacted her several times (she excused with being too busy). This might have been my biggest 
regret during the course of the fieldwork, as I hoped to be able to participate in a local patrol in the 
neighbourhood. At this level of my fieldwork six interviews have helped me to understand the 
practice of the CP model and the local experiences with it. I conducted four interviews with 
community members, in addition to the two expert interviews with the local transfer assistants. The 
organization of and participation in the workshop on citizen security in Cotahuma (explained 
below) with 50 barrio residents also gave me fruitful insights at this level. Participation at 
community meetings also gave me a better understanding of community dynamics and the everyday 
life of the barrio residents. At these meetings I could listen passively to their debates, grievances 
and their strategies for mobilization to build up “a social front of neighbours” (resident, workshop 
21/10/14). The workshop and the monthly assembly (ampliado) of October were held in the 
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community headquarter in Cotahuma, which the residents use frequently to gather. Another meeting 
I attended was a weekly Sunday-meeting of a local neighbourhood (Vida Nueva). Here I saw how 
poverty is taking hold just six kilometres from the central square of La Paz, as the meeting focused 
on the grave consequences of not being able to afford a drainage-system to avoid huge landslides 
during rain season. The last community gathering was held in the private home of a resident to 
accommodate a visit from the city mayor of La Paz.  
 
The third level: the ‘un-official narrative’ 
At this level I address local perception of security, legitimization of local violence and the 
unexpected consequences of the transfer of CP. It is based on interviews with neighbourhood 
council leaders and members, as well as commentaries I heard at the community meetings. I have 
conducted individual interviews with three community leaders (Marcos 24/1/14, Jorge 26/1/14 and 
Gonzalo 26/1/14), and a group interview with residents in Cotahuma: two women and one man 
(Roselyn, Juan and Carmen, group interview, 29/10/14). The key questions of the interviews were 
always about their collaboration with the police, how they perceive ‘security’ and what they 
themselves do to make their barrio safer. In general the interviews took the form of semi-structured 
conversation, and were conducted mostly in private homes of the residents. 
 
The interviews and multi-sided approach 
I refer to my interviews with the name of the interviewed and the date of the interview. The 
interviews with Ramiro Ruiz (2/10/14) Jorge (26/1/14), Gonzalo (26/1/14), Marcos (24/1/14), the 
group interview  (29/10/14) and well as the comments from the workshop participants (workshop 
21/10/14) were all conducted and transcribed in Spanish, which I speak fluently. The interviews 
with Loreta Telleria (Tellería 10/11/14), Adriana Cordero (Cordero 30/10/14) and the last I made 
with Ramiro Ruiz (Ruiz 21/11/14) were not recorded and are documented in field notes (in 
English). I have made the majority of my sources anonymous. Transcriptions, field notes and 
translations of quotes used can be forwarded if desired. 
 
During the course of my fieldwork I received inputs from an official and a neighbourhood level on 
a shifting basis: one day I interviewed the police, the next day I went to a neighbourhood meeting, 
and then I returned to my desktop to read documents and secondary material. The above-mentioned 
levels were therefore not structured for the sequence of my interviews and meetings, only the 
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research focus of the interviews. I intended to understand the coming about of CP as a dialectical 
process between global ideas, national translations of these into programs and practices, and their 
reception by actors in the local context. Marcus (1995) suggests, in his exploration of what he calls 
multi-sided ethnography, that as the “cultural logics so much sought after in anthropology are 
always multiply produced” (ibid.: 97) multi-sided ethnographic research becomes necessary. He 
also notes that due to the collapse of the easy distinction between what he frames as ‘world system’ 
and ‘lifeworld’, ethnography needs to be able to grasp how these levels are mutually intertwined. I 
could have done more to be a real multi-site ethnographer according to the description of Marcos 
(1995), but I have attempted to use the continuous shifts between the different sites actively in my 
understanding and analysis of policing locally.  
All my sources were aware of the fact that I was also in discussion with ‘the other side’ (see also 
Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 52-62 on the level of openness in the field), which might have 
resulted in more honesty and openness at some point (they want to ‘convince’ me about their truth 
about the police), but also scepticism to my intentions (‘is she on their side?’). I do believe that my 
emphasis on the fact that I am an academic researcher, who must be nuanced and ‘neutral’, 
somewhat allowed them trust me to not show only ‘the other side’s’ version of the story. 
 
The hillsides of La Paz: Gatekeepers and Context  
In January 2014, while interning at the Danish Embassy in Bolivia, I conducted a pre-study of this 
topic as my internship report. In order to make contact with the members of the local community I 
went to a part of La Paz where I had read that the population was quite active in creating security 
patrols (e.g. La Razon 18/8/13). The neighbourhood, or barrio, I looked for was Pasankeri, in the 
macro-district called Cotahuma. Through the sub-municipality in Cotahuma I obtained telephone 
numbers of all presidents of neighborhood councils in the district, and I called the first on the list: 
the head of the ‘vigilante committee’3 of the district 4 of Cotahuma, covering Pasankeri and three 
other barrios. The director, Marcos Guzman, promptly agreed to meet me the next day, and this 
first interview developed into four meetings with him in January and another ten meetings in 
September and October. Marcos Guzman has functioned as my gatekeeper (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 49-62) to the community since the beginning of my investigation in January 2014. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 According to the law of Popular Participation from 1994 (LPP 1994) it is called comite de vigilancia (oversight 
committee, c.f. Postero 2007: 129), but in 2013 it changed name to ’the organism for participation and social control’ 
(LPCS 2013). As the term ‘control social’ was mostly used in the field, I have chosen to call it the ‘committee for social 
control’. 
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Being the director of the committee for social control, I have been able to take advantage of his 
position as ‘broker’ between the neighbourhood residents and the state authorities. This makes him 
a kind of political entrepreneur mobilizing the people, distributing public funds for local 
investments as well as being, on occasions, the local moral evaluator and facilitator of ‘justice’ in a 
broad sense (such as having to oversee whether the citizens receive a just treatment from the 
authorities in regards to pubic investments etc.)4 As my gatekeeper representing ‘the community’ he 
might have been concerned with the picture of the community that I would paint. This means, as 
(ibid.: 51) remind us, that such a person will normally wish to ensure that the community 
perspective is portrayed in a favourable light, and he may therefore attempt to control the process of 
inquiry to some degree. In spite of the honest and strong relationship I developed with Marcos 
Guzman, it must be noted that on several occasions he did try to suggest my next research steps, 
and sometimes he even talked about my study as ‘our project’. The research would certainly have 
taken a different direction if I had not met Marcos Guzman.   
 
Some of the meetings with Marcos Guzman took the format of interviews, of which one was 
recorded and transcribed and the rest documented in field notes. The other meetings were informal 
conversations and planning of events, during or after which I always made field notes. As 
gatekeepers usually do (ibid.), Marcos suggested specific interviewees for me, and invited me to 
selected events in the neighbourhood. I welcomed most of his proposals, as that was a direct access 
to the council presidents and the community members in general. As an effort to avoid his complete 
control over the selection of sources, I tried with partial success to make my own interview 
arrangements with other community members at the four community meetings that I attended. The 
group interview with three residents in Tembladerani was the only result of this effort. In general 
people seemed to be shy, which is said to be a general character of people from the Bolivian 
highlands.  
 
The neighbourhood members that participated in the meetings and interviews represent mainly the 
barrios of Llojeta, Tembladerani and Higher and Lower Pasankeri, all belonging to the macro-
district of Cotahuma in the hillsides of La Paz. I characterize this zone as ‘urban periphery’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Marcos Guzman explained it as ‘liaisons’ who control, supervise and direct the development (Guzman 24/1/14), also 
explained in the laws LPP 1994 and LPCS 2013.  
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inhabited by the lower middle class.5 According to my own calculations, the area that they represent 
has approximately 50,000-60,000 inhabitants (based on account from sources and PB 2012: 22).  
 
The majority of my fieldwork took place in September-October 2014, during a 5-month stay in La 
Paz. The period of my fieldwork happened to fall just before and after the national presidential 
election of the 12th of October, when Evo Morales was re-elected for the third time since his 
landslide victory in 2005. This means that public discussions were dominated by the election 
campaign and popular politics, especially among those who were trying to mobilize the opposition, 
which includes La Paz’s municipal mayor and the majority of the population in the hillsides of La 
Paz. The already politicized field of citizen security became a hot topic and was even used actively 
in order to engage and motivate official actors to participate in interviews, in particular in the 
workshop of the 21st of October.  
 
A short note on Ruiz 
The logic applied to Marcos Guzman’s influence on my research process also applies to my key 
source among the police, Ramiro Ruiz. He has functioned as my gate-keeper to ‘the police’, 
particularly in understanding the methodological ideas with CP and its current implementation. He 
took me to a training seminar on CP for private security guards and made sure I met a selected 
number of his colleagues. I did not use these encounters directly in my analysis, but they formed 
part of my general picture of the police. His choices have therefore also coloured the picture to a 
reasonable extent, even though the note by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 51) about gatekeepers 
tending to ensure that their organization is portrayed in ‘a favourable light’ did not hold true here: 
Ruiz proved to be rather self-critical on behalf of the police force. This could be because Ruiz’s 
idea of ‘a favourable light’ is self-reflective and honest, rather than trying to cover up reality. 
 
The workshop: A window to the politics of policing and the local grievances 
Marcos Guzman’s most clear attempt to influence my research was his proposal to arrange a 
workshop with the neighbourhood council members and the three ‘officials’: the local commander !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 I suggest that the term ’urban periphery’ is characteristic of the place where my interlocutors live for two reasons: 
Firstly, their neighbourhoods are placed in the outer edge of the city of La Paz, in the hillsides (las laderas) bordering the 
city and municipality of El Alto. Secondly, the experienced position among the residents is that of living on the margins or 
periphery of the state. This is in line with how Risør (2010b) describes ‘state margins’ referring to Das and Poole (2004) 
as being something “situated in the very bodies of people” (Risør 2010b: 27). It should however be mentioned that in 
spatial terms, ‘the state’ is not far away, and state laws are indeed forming life in the hillsides. Hillside might sound rather 
rural, however, this is not the case here.  
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of the Police Station in Cotahuma (anonymous), the director of citizen security of the municipality 
of La Paz, Luis Ramallo and the Police colonel Ramiro Ruiz. The objective of this workshop was to 
create a platform for dialogue between the community and the authorities on the topic of citizen 
security and the relation between the community and the police. I was sceptical about the academic 
benefits I could get out of this, but agreed to participate and help organize the event – mostly out of 
curiosity and the desire to allow the two (conflicting) parties an opportunity to discuss possible 
measures for improvement. Ramallo and Ruiz both gave presentations to the approximately 50 
neighbourhood leaders present, who afterwards responded with comments, concerns and questions. 
Ruiz presented the ideas behind the model of Policia Comunitaria. The head of the Department of 
Citizen Security of the Autonomous Municipal Government of La Paz, Luis Ramallo, explained the 
politics and laws on citizen security at national and municipal level. The colonel at the local police 
station did not show up, though she had accepted the invitation a week before when I visited her in 
her office. A lower ranking police officer from another police district in La Paz showed up 
unexpectedly and also gave a presentation. For my research the workshop has served to give a 
better insight into local debates and discourses about citizen security. For my analytical purpose I 
have mostly used the commentaries from the community members, and only very few perspectives 
presented by the official state representatives, since they almost repeated what I had read in laws 
and official documents. 
 
Placing the Thesis in the Field 
With my research question I refer to extensive academic debates, as well as a rather large literature 
on the specific picture of citizen security in Bolivia. I find it necessary to mention some central 
works and academics in the field, as well as delineations I have had to make.  
 
A study of policing and not of lynch-violence 
When looking at the existing literature on security and insecurity in Bolivia (Risør 2010a+b, 
Goldstein 2012, Derpic 2013, Mollericona 2007, Kotonias 2009) one specific phenomena is 
dominant: that of lynch-violence as an expression of vigilante justice in the perceived absence of 
the state. The works mentioned have to a great extent nurtured my interest in the topic and helped 
me to understand the context of the local security scape in Bolivia and La Paz. Indeed, lynch-
violence is to this day used as a security measure for some Bolivian communities and clearly it 
cannot be ignored when studying security and new expressions of sovereignty in Bolivia. I will 
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nonetheless argue that there is an under-current related to security enforcement that is less visible, 
but still, to a high degree, changes the ‘established ideas’ of authority and sovereignty that due to 
the focus on lynching largely is left without due attention. I am not implying that the observations 
of Risør, Goldstein and colleagues are unimportant, nor that they are less ‘complex’, but I argue that 
the attraction of ‘the sensation’ and the brutality of lynching risks overshadowing explorations of 
more subtle and everyday practices of civil security work. My fieldwork confirmed that lynch 
violence is, to the police as well as citizens, an ever-present phenomenon in Bolivia. In the 
conversations I had with my sources it often appeared as a ‘mirror’ and a frontier phenomenon for 
legitimate behaviour and notions of security and insecurity. I argue that lynch violence makes the 
‘grey’ of what I am addressing in this thesis more ‘black’. It is not the case that lynch-violence (as 
described by Risør and Goldstein) is happening in a exclusively either state or non-state sphere per 
se, rather I argue that lynching is just one among many other, maybe less visible, security strategies 
utilized by Bolivian communities.  
 
To clarify, in my research I am concerned with the less visible everyday policing of barrio 
residents, which to some degree looks more like the state. I look at policing in the peripheries of La 
Paz, which in geographical terms is not notably further away from the state institutions than El 
Alto, as El Alto and La Paz have grown together during the last decade. However, I also believe 
that being formally a part of the municipality of La Paz implies stronger repercussions to state-
membership than that of El Alto (see also note 5). Furthermore, the starting point of my study is a 
police model that aims to engage the citizens in police work, which implies looking at local security 
strategies from a perspective distinct to that of Risør, Goldstein and their colleagues. At times I will 
make use of perspectives presented in these works, but I have no intension of making a comparative 
analysis, or to account for the complete bibliography of these authors.  
 
Secondary material: Key literature used 
In order to discuss the different claims to sovereignty that emerge globally as well as in Bolivia, I 
make use of theoretical notions from a range of scholars. Agamben (1998; 2000) is a central figure 
in this debate, and his notions have been elaborated further in works by Thomas Blom Hansen and 
Finn Stepputat (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; 2006). David Pratten and Atrayee Sen’s (eds.) book 
Global Vigilantes (2007) also give good insights into the debate about the polyvalent expressions of 
vigilantism, and their relation to sovereignty. Partha Chatterjee’s The Politics of the Governed: 
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Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (2004) has provided relevant perspectives in 
understanding how communities work in margins of the state, and how this gives the state and 
notions of citizenship both new form and new relevance. Besides the mentioned key works, I also 
refer to a range of academic articles. During the writing process I noted many opportunities to make 
comparisons with similar cases in other parts of the world, especially African examples. However, I 
have chosen to leave these as only brief reflections in the last part of the thesis (Chapter Eight), in 
order to focus on the study of policing in La Paz.  
 
Policy transfer-model as analytical lens 
To look at the transfer of globally circulating ideas to the local level (in particular Chapter Five) the 
analysis will be based on theory about ‘policy transfer’ and the proposed questions deriving from 
the Dolowitz and Marsh Model (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The seven questions are 1) Why do 
actors engage in policy transfer? 2) Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process? 
3) What is transferred? 4) From where are lessons drawn? 5) What are the different degrees of 
transfer? 6) What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? And the last, 7) How is the 
process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or policy “failure”?  
 
A policy transfer is characterised as a process in which knowledge and ideas about policies, 
administrative arrangements and institutions in one political setting are used in the development of 
policies, ideas, administrative arrangements and institutions in another political setting (ibid.: 5). As 
Dolowitz and Marsh state, some studies looking at such movements of ideas on policy tend to take 
for granted that a policy or a program is successfully implemented, if it is just transferred. They 
argue, though, that it is becoming increasingly apparent that policy transfer often leads to ‘policy 
failure’ (ibid.: 6). In this dissertation I did not wish to evaluate the success or failure of the 
implementation of community police in Bolivia. However, it proved to be impossible to ignore my 
sources’ many accounts on how the policing model has not yielded the results that were intended. 
To a great extent, this has become productive not only for my study and the new research questions 
that emerged, but also for the field of action of my sources. As such, I use it actively in my analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Analytical framework  
 
In the contemporary world, global flows cutting across the binary of national versus global have 
made it difficult to identify and describe the question of authority and sovereignty through the usual 
languages of state power and national sovereignty. What has been termed an “intensified global 
crisis of the nation-state as the main vehicle of sovereign power” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 296) 
has provoked a re-evaluation of the meaning of sovereignty. When it comes to the security of 
populations, the traditional language for understanding sovereignty also falls short. With the 
pluralization of policing, the sovereign state has been “reconfigured as but one node of a broader, 
more diverse ‘network of power’” (Loader 2000: 323), and new actors make claims on sovereign 
authority to settle civil and legal disputes. This chapter presents theoretical notions on the changes 
of politics and practices of security globally and the theoretical debate on contemporary 
sovereignty. Furthermore it presents Appadurai’s (1996) term scapes, as well as it sketches out 
reflections on what has been called the epistemic community, global blueprints and the transfer of 
these within the security field. Lastly it looks at notions on the government through community. 
The different theoretical notions together construe my analytical framework.  
 
The Changes of Politics and Practices of Security  
In an era of globalization and considerable attention on state failures, the question of citizen 
security has become a central part of the debate on new forms of public authority. We see how 
private and transnational forces are taking over where the state ‘fails’ (or outsources), whether it is 
in health, education, security or other welfare services (Chatterjee 2004; Goldsmith 2003). Along 
the same lines of argument it has been suggested that when the state falls short on providing general 
protective services to its people, other ‘public’ providers – often called non-state actors - appear and 
take over the provision of law and order in the security ‘vacuum’ (Goldsmith 2003: 4, Abrahams 
2007: 425). It is often understood in the literature as a tendency that has spread out with neoliberal 
globalization. The new era of security governance includes decentralization of policing and 
responsibilization of communities to take a greater share in the provision of security locally 
(Garland 2001, Pratten and Sen 2007: 2). These movements are often expressions of what has been 
called ‘privatization of indirect government’, on which the philosophy of CP is also based, as it has 
spread out globally in the 1980s and 1990s (Pratten and Sen 2007: 3). I will return to notions on the 
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new possibilities for governance through community below.  
 
In the general picture I have found two expressions of the appropriation of sovereignty by new 
actors to be dominant in the literature on contemporary security assemblages. One is privatization 
of security, or ‘corporate security’, as Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams (2011) among others 
address. The other tendency is what I call collectivization of security, such as vigilantism, as 
presented by David Pratten and Atreyee Sen (2007). Roughly speaking, both can be identified as 
movements away from the state.  
 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) scrutinize the phenomenon of how the private security sector, 
constituted by multinational and national private companies, is spreading out globally. Their focus 
is mainly on Africa, which they argue is the fastest growing consumer of private security. They also 
demonstrate how private security officers in many Latin American countries outnumber the public 
police, especially in the biggest cities in the continent.6 This growth of private security, they argue, 
is embedded in transformations in governance (ibid.: 23). The changes are part of the process of the 
partial state disassembly, and constitution of the ‘global assemblages’ linking national and global 
structures in complex reassembled networks of security (ibid.: 89).  
 
The other expression of security that takes part in this reassembled network of security is a 
collectivization of security, also framed ‘vigilantism’. According to the definition by Ray 
Abrahams, vigilantism in its ‘ideal type form’ implies “an organized attempt by a group of 
‘ordinary citizens’ to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, 
often by resort to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the 
police and courts” (Abrahams 2007: 423). This expression of collective action working in informal 
spheres is mostly seen in the form of a mob of people reacting on immediate emotions of injustice 
and fear, to which vigilante violence becomes an answer (Pratten and Sen 2007). Vigilantism is a 
concept with a long political history, and it has many expressions. In this thesis I have chosen not to 
study local policing in Bolivia with the term ‘vigilantism’ as primary theoretical point of departure. 
Firstly because this has already been done (e.g. Goldstein 2012 and Risør 2010b), and secondly, I 
analytically attempt to go beyond the complexities of using a notion that is both very academic in 
character, but also an emic concept and a practice used by states. Nevertheless I use the literature on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 There are approximately 1,6 million registered employees in the private security companies in Latin America, and some 
further 2 million working informally (or illegally) (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 21). 
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vigilantism to put focus on the blurriness that the phenomenon of ‘taking law into own hands’ 
involves and how it works in an “awkward borderland between law and illegality” (Abrahams 
2007: 422).  
 
Both expressions form part of the overall changes of politics and practices of security globally and 
locally, changes that challenge the traditional notion of formal authority and state sovereignty. 
However, as Saskia Sassen (2008) and Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) argue, the various 
expressions of denationalization of security provision do not necessarily mean that the public (the 
state) becomes ‘smaller’ or less powerful. The ‘private’ and the ‘public’ are not mutually exclusive; 
instead, the boundary between the two spheres becomes blurry in contemporary security practices.7 
The ‘old binary’, as Sassen argues, is found in most globalization literature and tends to assume that 
with intensified globalization the national decreases and loses its significance (Sassen 2008: 61). 
Instead, what is at stake today is a restructuring of power; a pluralisation of actors constantly 
negotiating fields of power constituting and working in complex global assemblages (Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2011, Loader 2000). The changes in security provision challenge the traditional 
understanding of the state as possessing the monopoly on the use of legitimate force, which is an 
inherent component of national sovereignty in its original Weberian inspired definition.  
The Contested Idea of National Sovereignty 
Sovereignty, as it was defined along with the foundation of the system of sovereign territorial states 
after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, has an inherent link to state territoriality. A sovereign, as 
famously personified in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, has a range of attributes that mark its 
sovereign power (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 2). These include e.g. the power to wage war against 
enemies of the state, to make and remake laws, to have the last judgement in legal disputes and to 
impose tax on subjects (Bodin 1992: 46 in Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 7). To realize the modern 
idea of sovereignty, to paraphrase Abrams (1988), as ‘popular sovereignty’, the people’s support to 
the state is necessary. ‘The people’ became the body of citizens being governed by state laws, who 
in return for citizen rights (coming forward in various phases through the nineteenth and twentieth 
century) pay with their loyalty to the state (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 10). The ‘political love’ of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 In this thesis I utilize the term ’grey zone’ to entangle the notion of the blurry boundary-drawings. Zygmunt Bauman has 
used the term ‘grey area’ in his discussion of modernity, e.g. in stating ”hermeneutic problems are likely to persist as a 
permanent ‘grey area’ […] inhabited by unfamiliars” (Bauman, Zygmunt, 1990, Modernity and Ambivalence, pp. 143-169, 
in (Ed.): Mike Featherstone, Global Culture. Nationalism, globalization and modernity. London, Newbury Park & New 
Delhi: Sage Publications). Bauman studied the modernity, and in this thesis I am dealing with the late modernity. 
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the population for the nation was being constructed in schools, in popular culture, in the army and 
through institutional and disciplinary practices (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 9). This was also the 
job for the newly independent colonial states: After a long period with authoritarian and violent 
colonial rule, in which European legal systems were imposed on African, Asian and Latin 
American colonized societies (Merry 1992: 363), these nations became independent, and a new 
nation-building project was to be initiated (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 23).  
 
The popular sovereignty of a state is to be constituted and assured through (permanent) processes of 
state formation and claims of legitimate authority (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Chatterjee 2004). 
Only by being performed and reiterated on a daily basis is sovereignty made effective (Adler-
Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:7). This leads on to the notion that sovereignty is never a 
given ‘thing’, but is always based on performativity (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). The possibilities 
for the state to perform sovereignty have increasingly been complicated by globalization. 
Intensified interstate cooperation and supranational institutions, global migration, states dependent 
on development aid and economic assistance and the establishment of international law and 
international courts of justice have provoked the question whether sovereignty is still a meaningful 
concept in today’s world (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 3). The pluralisation of the 
use of violence for establishing social order is an essential component of the notion of the 
reassembled version of sovereignty and authority that we see today.  
 
Sovereignty as social practice 
Hansen and Stepputat propose to re-conceptualize the territorial state and its sovereignty as social 
and political constructs, and suggest a focus on the internal constitution of sovereign power within 
states, by means of exercise of violence over bodies and populations (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 
2). Sovereignty then, becomes related to the production of biopolitical bodies, following the notion 
of Giorgio Agamben (1998: 6; Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 16). It implies the desymbolized and 
‘bare’ life as the ‘included outside’ of ‘the sacred man’, Homo Sacer, upon which a community 
constitutes itself and its moral order (Agamben 1998, see also Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 295). 
The banished life of Homo Sacer may be killed by anybody, but may not be religiously sacrificed 
(Agamben 1998: 53). It happens in a sphere of the sovereign decision, which suspends law in the 
state of exception and thus makes it possible to decide over life and death, constituting the very 
sovereign of the sovereign (ibid.).  
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The changes mentioned have not made sovereignty less relevant as an “ontologically empty 
category” (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 7) when dealing with statehood, power and international 
relations. But in the light of the ‘new’ epistemological perspective, sovereignty is today taking on 
another form than as it was originally defined. The global flows that take part in this reconfiguration 
of sovereignty work in and between different global scapes, which I will now turn to. 
‘Scapes’ as Framework for Fields of Governance 
In this thesis I frame the levels of the travelling of security techniques, with special emphasis on 
community policing, as ‘scapes’. I have borrowed the term from Ajun Appadurai (1996), though he 
has not unfolded such a ‘security scape’ as I do here. I am not aiming at analysing security in 
accordance to Appadurai’s five scapes. Rather I make use of the term because it has a relevant 
ontological view, which I find productive for the way I will scrutinize CP’s travel from the global to 
the local level.  
 
The global flows of the contemporary world, Appadurai notes, occur in and through the 
disjunctures among ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes (ibid.: 
37). I propose to see the global flows as transfers of ideas, practices and frameworks for 
interpretation and intend to add a new ‘security scape’ to the five scapes (see note 2). The scapes 
work as building blocks of what (extending Benedict Anderson’s (1993) Imagined Communities) 
could be called imagined worlds, meaning the multiple worlds that are constituted by the 
historically and politically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe 
(Appadurai 1996: 33). As the various scapes will always be perspectival to our perception of the 
world, ‘security’, for example, does not look the same for everybody. The worldview that any 
person constructs depends on who she is, where she is, and what scapes she sees and how these are 
interpreted (ibid.). This means that there will be multiple ways of imagining the (‘safe’) world, and 
so there will be multiple imagined (‘safe’) worlds (Appadurai 1996, Powell and Steel 2011: 76). As 
Anderson (1993) makes us remember, the creation of community is dependent on the imaginations 
of every person: through imagined kinship and sharedness, community comes into being and forms 
new imaginations. It must then also be through influencing and forming these collective 
imaginations, e.g. the definition of ‘a safe world’ that communities can be governed. 
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Seeing security as taking place and being formed in a global scape makes it possible to understand 
the instructions and mechanisms implied in it as globally circulating techniques of power. I argue 
that the circulating ideas and practices flowing between different scapes are formed in epistemic 
community/ies. From this, some ideas and practices become ‘global blueprints’ and are translated to 
local political settings through policy transfer processes.  
Global Blueprints, Epistemic Community and Policy Transfer 
Saskia Sassen describes how the unbundled sovereignty from nation-state to global and 
supranational arenas and institutions creates new rules constraining the possible actions of states. 
These count among others human rights regimes and agreements on environmental management 
(Sassen in Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 32). The creation of global discourses, such as 
empowerment as the golden strategy for democratic participation and responsibilization as a 
governance technology (Li 2007: 275-277; Cruikshank 1999), also takes place in and between the 
different scapes. They build on each other, and at times mutually reinforce specific ideas, which 
then become influential discourses (see e.g. Dean 2010: 246). Appadurai gives the example of 
democracy, which today “sits at the center of a variety of ideoscapes” (Appadurai 1996:  37) 
building on ideas from the other scapes. This establishes certain technologies and mechanism as 
global blueprints for action.  
 
I suggest seeing global blueprints as deriving from, but also constructing epistemic communities 
(Haas 1992). Haas describes epistemic community as a network of professionals that share a set of 
normative, principled and causal beliefs. These beliefs provide a value-based rationale for the social 
action of community members, linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes and 
a common policy enterprise in order to solve problems (ibid.: 3). What happens when these global 
ideas become implemented in local contexts could be called policy transfer, as proposed by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), which I have already presented. The globally flowing ideas and 
practices are in the contemporary world seldom directly enforced on any society, rather they are 
inserted in local contexts through the liberty to choose (Rose 2000) based on the information 
available. It means that in studying global flows of ideas and practices, one needs to be aware of 
discursive formations and how they frame the local conceptualizations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘just’ 
and ‘unjust’. The governance of liberty happens today largely through in-direct rule and self-
governance.  
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In-direct rule and self-governance  
In place of the ‘centripetal’ nation-state, which articulates and concentrates power in national 
disciplinary institutions, there has been a movement towards a new “centrifugal multiplication of 
specialized assemblages” (Deukmedjian 2013; Sassen 2008). The centrifugality operates through 
in-direct rule, global networks, international law schemes and self-governance (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005 and Sassen 2008). The new techniques of power that have appeared in this 
centrifugality, in line with Foucault’s idea of governmentality (Dean 2010), are also less ‘visible’ 
than more direct or repressive forms of rule. Chatterjee (2004) notes how the governmentalization 
of the state secures legitimacy “by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population” (ibid.: 
34). Rose (2000) describes how technologies of freedom have been invented to ‘govern at a 
distance’, through indirect government which is only made possible through the autonomous 
choices of actors that have relative independence (ibid.: 324). Governance at a distance implies that 
the governance of conduct is performed by a range of actors and not only the state and its entities 
(ibid.: 323).  !
Governance through Community 
The performance of sovereign power needs the approval of its subjects to be effective. Thus, the 
people are an inherent part of the constitution of sovereignty. Through rituals and disciplinary 
activities, such as education and empowerment, through the punishment of subjects violating the 
law or finally, through the exclusion of dangerous beings, the sovereign power can be reiterated 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 8-10). But this process of exclusion is also inclusive. By making 
‘wrong-doings’ publicly visible by punishing it with violence (or deprivation of liberty), or 
stigmatizing ‘bad behaviour’ in pedagogy and public discourses, the people are “governed through 
the self-steering forces of honour and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity” (Rose 2000: 
324) to behave as ideal and virtuous citizens loyal to the law and norms established by the 
sovereign power on behalf of the community (ibid., Hansen and Stepputat 2005).  
 
Hansen and Stepputat describe this as an inclusive exclusion, and note that expulsion is, and has 
been, one of the most fundamental operations of sovereign power (ibid.: 17), whether it is by the 
state, a local authority, a community, a warlord or a local militia (ibid.). The dichotomy between 
exclusion and inclusion is what constitutes the demarcation of ‘the people’ (Agamben 2000). ‘The 
people’ is a polar concept, indicating the complex relation and movement between on the one side 
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‘the bare life’ (measures of exclusion) and on the other ‘political existence’ (inclusion), he argues 
(ibid.: 30). “In order to be, the people must negate ifself through its opposite” (ibid.: 31). However, 
one should not conceive ‘the people’ as a stable concept, instead it is “an empty signifier” (Laclau 
1996, in Buur and Jensen 2004) that is constantly negotiated and contested by diverse actors 
claiming legitimate authority. Notions of community are therefore inherently unstable, as Buur and 
Jensen (2004) argue, and as “no groups are permanently able to hegemonise or stabilize a particular 
reading of the moral community […] the moral community has to be performed on a perpetual 
basis” (ibid.: 146). In the performance of authority on and for a certain community, measures of 
inclusion and exclusion of society become a constituent part of the conduct of society. The 
formation of the people or the community builds on the on-going categorizations of different kinds 
of people in ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘citizen’ or ‘criminal’ etc. 
 
To have a ‘political existence’ has often come to mean being possessor of political and civil rights 
and freedoms, making you belong to the civil society constituted by citizens (and not subjects). 
Partha Chatterjee (2004) takes up this discussion. The formal structure of the modern democratic 
state is based on the idea that everybody is a member of civil society as a citizen with equal rights 
(ibid.: 38). However, in practice this is not how it works, Chatterjee argues, stating that this 
characteristic of civil society actually only involves a relatively small section of the population 
(ibid.). Instead he proposes the term ‘political society’: The political society is inhabited by groups 
and associations who “transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work” (ibid.: 
40), such as occupying land without permission, consuming water or electricity illegally or 
travelling without tickets in public transport. As the livelihood of these groups depends on 
trespassing the law, they cannot normally be treated as ‘other civil associations’ following 
legitimate pursuits, though they can neither be ignored, Chatterjee notes (ibid.). Instead, those 
inhabiting the political society are dealt with, by the state, as convenient instruments for the 
administration of welfare to marginalized and underprivileged parts of the population. However, if 
the claims to lands and livelihood put forward as rights by the law-trespassers are treated as rights 
by state agencies, it would “invite further violation of […] civil laws” (ibid.). So what is going on, 
he argues, is a constant negotiation of the categorization and definition of civic rights, portraying 
how powerful the constructed concepts of citizenship and rights have become. The political society 
places itself in the complexity between being embedded in the state and working beyond – or even 
indirectly against - the state.  
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Towards an Analytical Framework 
In the following analysis I will utilize key concepts from the theoretical notions presented above. 
The changes in security and state power are essential parts of the context of this study, as they point 
to not only new security practices but also reconfigurations of rule and governance. These will be 
taken further in the next Chapter, addressing the global security scape. Responsibilization and in-
direct governance are key concept for my understanding of the CP model and the mechanisms that 
are to activate the community through empowerment and rituals. The reconceptualised idea of 
sovereignty will be crucial in the last part of the analysis, where I will look at how CP triggers new 
claims to sovereignty and how this is based on the performance and practice of informal community 
groups. The ideas of performativity and the perpetual formation of sovereignty are essential for my 
analytical perspective. This constructivist epistemological perspective is also prevalent in my 
understanding the on-going formation of ‘the community’, ‘the state’ and well as the dynamic 
mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion. The constant negotiation of the definition of danger, 
security, right and wrong is what constitutes legitimate authority and what forms practice. In 
today’s world the governance of conduct is performed by a multitude of actors, which will become 
exemplified mostly in Chapter Seven of this thesis, as it addresses how the community begin to 
utilize similar strategies as those of the governmentality state. The global flows of ideas, which also 
function as building blocks of our imagery of the world, move between different scapes at both 
global and local level. In Chapter Five I will narrow in on the transfer of the specific idea of CP 
from the global security scape to the local security scape. Now will follow my identification of the 
global security scape.  
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Chapter 4: The Global Security Scape  
 
In line with the notions on the changes of sovereignty and the upcoming of global security 
assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 90), globally circulating techniques of security 
should be understood as a fragmentation of governance in a centrifugal movement ‘away’ from the 
state. Ian Loader (2000) describes it as a pluralisation of policing, including a gradual de-
monopolisation of the coercive force, which traditionally belonged to the state and now involves 
also non-state actors. The paradox is that these new security initiatives, on the one hand, 
denationalizes authority while, on the other hand, work to strengthen the accomplishment of state 
law and create what the state considers to be ‘security’.  The relevance of the state is maintained, 
often in ambivalent and polyvalent manners, making statehood look different than earlier. This 
chapter will map out tendencies and developments in what I call the global security scape, arguing 
that in this scape, the definition of ‘danger’, ‘security’ and ‘order’, and the provision of these, 
become essential elements in claiming sovereignty and as techniques for governing the people.  
 
Responsibilization and Securitization 
The predominant globally circulating techniques of power in term of security provision can be 
understood as tendencies relating to techniques of individual responsibilization (Rose 2000: 324; 
Deukmedjian 2013: 66; Garland 2001: 124). ‘Responsibilization’ implies a decentralization of 
responsibilities away from the state towards new actors. I mentioned in Chapter Three privatization 
and collectivization of security provision, and it should be underlined that the decentralization that 
these different tendencies implies often varies between being be state-anticipated and beyond state 
control. Dean (2010) describes what he calls ‘the new prudentialism’ as implying a multiple 
responsibilization of individuals, families, households and communities for their own risks (see also 
Rose 2000). One of the risks Dean mentions, in line with Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992), is that 
of becoming a victim of crime. Dean sees various tendencies in contemporary society that seek to 
manage risk and the individual responsibility ranging from private health insurances, privatization 
of education as well as community policing and neighbourhood watch schemes. As he argues, they 
”are all instances of contriving practices of liberty in which the responsibilities for risk 
minimization become a feature of the choices that are made by individuals, households and 
communities as the consumers, clients and users of services” (Dean 2010: 194). Freedom to choose 
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becomes constitutive for the responsibilization of risk minimization in the demand for security 
articulated by citizens and authorities. The citizens are understood as consumers and clients and 
become, through education and empowerment, able to determine danger and manage insecurity. In 
contemporary governmental programs citizens are to govern themselves in the complex web of 
increasing numbers of risks and insecurity factors (Rose 2000; Beck 1992). Responsibilization of 
‘the client’ - which would, in a Western bias be of the individual, but in my case from Bolivia is the 
community - implies a movement towards a marketization of services. This is a development that 
expands the determination of ‘security’ in self-perpetuating circles, I argue, in line with Anne 
Leander (2005). Ole Wæver (2011) explains how a so-called speech act can ‘securitize’ something, 
giving it a new dimension of special importance. This makes it possible to handle the subject – that 
now has become a security matter - in another political arena beyond the established rules justifying 
“extraordinary measures” (ibid.: 473).  
Security and Sovereignty 
The definition of something as a security matter must then be the first step, in this security scape, in 
a claim to sovereignty. Giorgio Agamben sees it linked to the production of ‘the banished life’ that 
can be killed with impunity in a state of exception (Agamben 1998: 6; Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 
16), as presented in Chapter Three. Furthermore, Agamben understands ‘the sovereign police’ as 
“the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange between violence and right 
that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is shown more nakedly and clearly than anywhere 
else” (Agamben 2000: 104,5). More than being an administrative function of law enforcement, the 
police are the possessors of the legal authority to make the distinction between law and order and 
crime and chaos. Thus ‘violence’ and ‘security’ become dependent on each policeman’s ethical 
discretion in the actual case, in a complex framework of laws and norms. And that is what 
constitutes their sovereignty. As Agamben notes, “the rationales of ‘public order’ and ‘security’ on 
which the police have to decide on a case-by-case basis define an area of indistinction between 
violence and right that is exactly symmetrical to that of sovereignty” (Ibid.:103).  
 
The negotiation of what is ‘secure’ and ‘dangerous’ takes place in all societies, at local as well as 
global levels, I argue. Agamben has dealt with it in a more local sense, though it is not less relevant 
to look at this ambivalence of security at the global political level. In recent years, ‘national 
security’, one of the oldest and most important elements of foreign policy, has been complemented 
by a focus on citizen security, or human security as it sometimes is called today (Duffield 2005). 
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Louise Andersen argues that citizen security in transitional societies and ‘fragile’ states has become 
the new global security concern of Western governments and a key focus in contemporary 
international aid work (Andersen 2006: 1-2).  
 
Policing as a globally circulating technique of power 
In terms of ‘policing’ as a tool in international aid, Brogden and Nijhar (2005) argue that during the 
last decade, policing strategies and materials have become a major part of the export drive from the 
West to transitional societies such as ‘third world’ countries. Community Policing (CP) might be 
one of the most used models in this fashion (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 5). Several actors take part 
in this transfer of ideas and policies counting among others national governments, police forces, 
NGOs, individuals and private corporations, they argue (ibid.). In a context of growing awareness 
of risks and insecurity and little trust in the state apparatus, efforts are being made to improve 
citizen security and re-legitimize the public law enforcement actors (Garland 2001: 124). This is 
partly done by engaging community members to become active citizens and performers of social 
control, as part of a more general empowerment discourse. The inherent logic of the modern type of 
law enforcement is that by decentralizing responsibility, state sovereignty can be re-claimed 
through the self-government of the people (ibid., Dixon 2007: 176).  
 
An element in the philosophy of CP is the responsibilization of the population to do surveillance in 
their neighbourhood. When the barrio residents are alert to strange and foreign – potentially 
dangerous – figures and movements, following the state and police logic of what constitutes 
‘danger’, the community helps the police and the state to maintain control. Garland stresses that the 
state task today is not to command and control, but to persuade and align in order to make sure that 
“other actors play their part” (Garland 2001: 126). The big challenge in this perspective is for the 
state to make sure that its logic of what constitutes danger and instructions for how to deal with 
danger follows the blue prints laid out by the official authorities. However, since trust in the public 
institutions is often lacking, the complication is that populations do not necessarily follow these 
logics of the state. The history of CP has been driven by attempts at settling this inherent 
ambivalence at the heart of the ‘governance-at-a-distance’ approach. 
Community Policing as it was Thought and Practiced 
Patterson (2010) places the beginning of modern law enforcement to be with the establishment of 
London Metropolitan Police in 1829. With principles adopted by Robert Peel, who at that time was 
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the Home Secretary, the elevated crime rate in London was to be tackled (Patterson 2010). The new 
model was based on working preventively instead of reacting only on crimes already occurred. 
Regular patrol areas, known as ‘beats’, were established, where the so-called ‘bobbied’ (small 
Roberts) policed. The model developed through the 20th century, and in the 1960’s outright CP 
initiatives began to develop, mainly in the US and UK, as a direct attempt to improve the police 
image among the population, Garland argues (2001: 124). The reasoning was that by policing a 
clearly delineated area, which would safeguard physical proximity of the police in the communities, 
police-public relations would improve (ibid.). CP was about strengthening the dialogue between 
police and public, focused on responsiveness and support for community crime prevention. The 
new policing tradition, which became further consolidated in the 1980’s (ibid.), “turns traditional 
policing on its head”, Kappeler and Gaines state (2011: 4). It empowers the community rather than 
dictating what it should do (ibid.). 
 
However, as CP models8 became more widespread in the 1980’s onwards, they had difficulties that 
prevented complete implementation. According to Garland (2001: 124) it became “an all-pervasive 
rhetoric”, and he confirms Dixon’s statement that most CP programs did not develop from the pilot-
project level (Dixon 2007). One mistake has been the establishment of small, specialized units in 
specific neighbourhoods as a way of implementing the CP model, Patterson argues (2010). This 
leads to dispersed and differentiated implementation and risks favouritism of certain segments of 
population (ibid.). Furthermore, Patterson stresses that many practitioners of CP are unsure of who 
to serve and how to serve them. Some use the approach of devoted neighbourhood advocacy while 
others perform ‘aggressive street crime suppression’ he argues (Patterson 2010: 5). The evaluation 
by Patterson is that CP has been widespread because it “seems to make sense” (ibid.), even though 
it has not been proven to be notably better in order to fight crime than other alternatives. But “just 
as professionalism9 appeared to be the "one best way" for half a century, so now is community 
policing the orthodox doctrine” (Patterson 2010: 5).  
 
In line with this, Brogden and Nijhar (2005) suggest that community-oriented policing represents a 
historically-legitimated model for export, due to its roots in the conservative ideologies of the 
Anglo-Saxon policing structure. CP has become the safeguard against the “forces of darkness” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 also known as problem-oriented policing, neighbourhood-oriented policing, or community-oriented policing 
9 Patterson uses ’professionalism’ to describe the type of law enforcement that was promoted around the end of the 19th 
Century and onwards, as a state-led reform-process aiming to eradicate police corruption and brutality (Patterson 2010: 
2) 
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(ibid.: 4), and with its very democratic face it is easily presented as the “elixir for solving human 
rights challenges” (ibid.: 5).  
 
This brief history of modern policing shows that community-oriented policing is not a novel 
invention. However, the new trend in this is the export of this model of policing to new settings as 
part of international aid programs. Furthermore, policing, to an increased extent, works in the 
complex network of global assemblages and schemes of governance through community. In this 
fashion it forms part of what I term the contemporary global security scape 
Interim Conclusion 
I have explored how the contemporary global security scape implies a movement away from the 
state and towards more fragmented and pluralized ways of law enforcement. The proposed security 
techniques in this scape decentralize state authority on the one hand, but on the other hand aim at 
reinforcing state law and state logics of ‘danger’ and ‘security’ through technologies of ‘governance 
at a distance’. I have portrayed how security is a special field, as it implies biopolitical interventions 
and how the definition of security and order becomes elements of new sovereignty claims and 
governance of communities. CP was initiated in order to re-establish legitimacy and control of the 
state and is based on the responsibilization of communities to do policework. However, despite of 
its global blueprint deriving from the Anglo-Saxon conviction of being the safeguard against the 
‘forces of darkness’, CP has proven to be difficult to implement. The next chapter will turn the 
focus on the formal transfer of CP as a globally blueprinted security technique to the Bolivian 
context. !
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Chapter 5: The Transfer to the Local 
Security Scape 
 
The following chapter will present the formal transfer of CP, as a special policy for security, from 
the global to the local level of La Paz, Bolivia. Based on a genealogical-inspired analysis of CP in 
urban Bolivia, I argue that the intellectual baggage of the implicated transfer actors is dominated by 
an Anglo-Saxon way of thinking and ‘best-practices’. CP has its foundation in the ideology of 
participative democracy and decentralization of state tasks through responsibilization. In addressing 
how the global ideas of modern policing and security instruments are being translated into the 
language and strategies of the Bolivian police, it will become clear how CP was initiated with a 
strong hope of being able solve the legitimacy crisis of the police and the state in general.  
 
The context of insecurity in Bolivia !
Bolivia and Latin America struggle hard with increasing problems related to violence and a 
perceived insecurity. In 2013, insecurity and delinquency were measured as the biggest concerns of 
the Bolivian population (ONSC 2013: 8). Surprisingly the concerns related to poverty, 
unemployment and social conflicts were of less importance to the surveyed population, despite the 
fact that Bolivia has until recently been categorized as the poorest country in South America 
(cepal.org). In another observatory related to perceptions of crime and gangesterism in La Paz 
crime in the neighbourhood is measured to be the biggest problem (49.4%), followed by the lack of 
police presence (25%) and after that problems related to alcohol (24%) (PIEB 2014). 71% of the 
Bolivians evaluate the police institution as ‘unsatisfactory’ (LAPOP 2014: 14) echoing with another 
survey ranking the police as the worst evaluated of all public institutions dealing with citizen 
security, surpassed by private security companies and neighbourhood councils (ONSC 2013: 19-20, 
25). !
In the context of deep perception of insecurity and little trust in police capabilities, the Bolivian 
government has launched several laws, policies and plans in order to tackle public insecurity and 
the legitimacy crisis of the state apparatus. Special police forces on public and domestic violence 
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and drug trafficking have been established.10 The State Constitution from 2009 (CPE 2009) 
acknowledged legal pluralism by law, implying that the indigenous peasant justice system can 
function parallel to the ordinary justice system. Furthermore laws have been launched to improve 
citizen security, most prominently the 2012 Citizen Security Law (LCSSL 2012). However, as these 
initiatives are representatives of the state, the majority of the population perceives them as being 
little trustworthy and combined with expected corruption and abuse of power (LAPOP 2014). Lack 
of legitimacy and presence of the state has been one of the main reasons for the rather widespread 
lynch violence in Bolivia (Goldstein 2012), which, of Latin-American countries, ranks as number 
two after Guatemala in the highest level of lynching (Defensor del Pueblo 2013).  
 
The introduction of CP in 2005 is directly - by the police itself - presented as an effort to re-
legitimize the Bolivian police force (PB 2014a: 37, PB 2014c: 68). I further argue that CP can be 
seen as a state effort to try to recover the ‘lost’ spheres, in which the people have begun to rule over 
the law. But before I look further into this, I will focus on the insertion of CP in urban Bolivia, 
which, despite celebrating its 10th anniversary, is still in process of implementation today.  
Emergence of Bolivian Community Policing  
CP came officially to Bolivia as a coordinated transfer by local authorities and international 
cooperation actors. To understand the intellectual baggage of the model of CP most of the questions 
of the policy transfer model proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) will now be addressed. The 
list of ‘what’ can be transferred is long and includes policy goals, -content, -instruments, -programs, 
institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons (ibid.: 12). I understand the police 
model that was transferred to Bolivia as a concrete program for security, but also a specialised 
technology (or instrument, using Dolowitz and March’s term) for re-legitimizing the Bolivian 
Police Force. CP as a security technology has clear ideological overtures, and promises ‘a shift of 
paradigm’, according to the Bolivian constitution (CPE 2009, PB 2014b).  
 
By the British CP is clearly based on a rights-based approach, framed as “the people’s right to be 
involved in formulating policing policies” (Coloma 2013: 1). I understand CP as a governance 
technology that, in line with what Dixon describes about South African sector policing, promises to 
meet higher policy goals such as bridging the gap between police and public and establishing the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Such as the Special Forces to fight crime (FELCC), drug traffic (FELCN) and violence against women (FELCV) 
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community as an “active role player” in the provision of security (Dixon 2007: 173). In official 
documents from the Bolivian Police, CP is portrayed as an instrument or technology to increase 
participative democracy (e.g. PB2014a+b+c). CP is furthermore framed with the concepts 
‘philosophy’ and ‘working model’ (ibid.), or even a ‘new paradigm’, as the Constitution promises 
(CPE 2009). The Bolivian Police’s colonel of higher police studies, Ramiro Ruiz, explained to me 
that it is important to see it as a philosophy and a fundamental working model, in order to avoid CP 
becoming a specialized unit within the police (Ruiz 2/10/14). It is therefore not understood as a 
reform of the police. 
 
The police officer is to be “the state in every corner, ready to establish public order on every 
occasion” (PB 2011: 9), as with the ‘bobbies’ on the ‘beat’ in old London. Bolivian policing today 
is about the inclusion of new actors and security should be ”produced with the population” (PB 
2014c: 33), whereas it was before ”delivered to the population” (ibid.: 35). Furthermore Human 
Rights are now a part of the new paradigm, which was before “the opposite” (ibid.). The police are 
now to analyze the problem, in order to work preventively and not only solve one problem as an 
isolated case (PB2014c: 35-38). Under the ‘old paradigm’ of policing, the police were seen “as 
having the exclusive competence” (ibid.). Their policing strategy was based on strong surveillance 
to keep control and compliance was measured by performance, such as the number of fees handed 
out (PB2014c). The transformation of the police paradigm should evoke incentives for innovation 
and paving the way for links to the community by mechanisms of decentralization, it is stated 
(ibid.).  
 
The two paradigms could also be called the ‘Latin model’ and the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’. The Latin, 
also known as the French, continental or the Napoleonic model, was created after the French 
National Gendarmerie in 1791 and is characterized as being repressive and reactive. It has been the 
principle model in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium, and obviously also the countries colonized by 
these.  The Anglo-Saxon Model comes, as already mentioned, from metropolitan London, inspired 
by the 19th century British Prime Minister Robert Peel (PB 2011: 3). So basically the idea of CP 
was to transform the police from the Latin model to the Anglo-Saxon model.  
 
Chronology of the implementation process 
Bolivian’s version of CP was initiated in 2005, through a pilot project for the city of La Paz, 
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financed by the British Embassy and coordinated by the trio: the Municipal Government of La Paz, 
the Observatory for Democracy and National Security, and the General Command of the National 
Police (PB 2014a: 44). The first ‘visible’ installation of the CP model happened in 2006, when a 
community police unit was implemented under the Departmental Police Command in La Paz, and 
functioned primarily in the city’s central district, Max Paredes, which was considered the most 
dangerous zone. The construction of Integrated Police Stations (EPIs) and small police modules 
began here, and later spread out through the city. In 2010 the pilot project was extended to other 
Municipal Districts and the City of El Alto (PB 2014a: 1). In the other two big Bolivian cities, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, models of CP were also initiated. Models that, despite not being 
directly financed by the British Embassy, still share key characteristics with the one from La Paz 
(see Tellería 2008).11 With the Plan for a Safe Life 2012-2016 (PNSC 2012) being a natural 
extension of the Law on Citizen Security (LCSSL 2012), CP in earnest became a key feature of the 
Bolivian security scape (PB 2013c), at least formally.  
 
Authorities and neighbourhood leaders refer to the citizen security law from 2012 as being the 
milestone of moving the Bolivian Police closer to the population. With the law, the National 
Observatory for Citizen Security was created under the Vice Ministry of Citizen Security, and the 
Plan for a Safe Life declares that between 5% and 10% of the annual public budget of departmental 
and municipal governments should be spent on improving citizen security (PNSC 2012). With the 
citizen security law CP was formally acknowledged as the working model of the Bolivian Police. 
This accomplishment is by the ‘transfer assistant’ from British Embassy Adriana Cordero 
experienced as “a great struggle”, and the embassy’s “maximum achievement” in their work with 
implementing CP in Bolivia (Cordero 30/10/14). In the transfer of CP to Bolivia, Adriana Cordero 
plays a key role, which I will now turn focus on to.  
The Key Actors in Policy Transfer 
According to Adriana Cordero, the idea of bringing the CP model to Bolivia came from Ramon 
Quintana who, at that time, was an independent consultant with a past as a sociologist, military 
officer and politician, and now is the Minister of the Presidency in Bolivia. Inspired by his 
experiences from Colombia in 2004, he proposed the idea to the British Embassy (Cordero 
30/10/14), backed up by two written publications on the matter. The Embassy engaged in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Even though it could have been relevant and interesting for this dissertation, I have unfortunately not been able to 
study and compare all three projects in the different cities.  
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initiative, agreed to fund the project and involved representatives from the police force of Northern 
Ireland with what was perceived as “considerable operational experience of implementing 
community policing initiatives” (Brit. Emb. 2010). I believe that Quintana’s book, Police and 
Democracy in Bolivia: a pending institutional policy (Quintana et al 2013), paved the way for 
political attention to the subject, and made the field “fertile for reception” (Newburn and Sparks 
2004: 8). In 2005 he pronounced more directly his proposal of police reform, in an article titled 
Towards a Community Police (Quintana 2005). With British cooperation it was made possible 
financially, and based on UK’s famous expertise with the police model combined with its 
‘democratic face’ it was blueprinted internationally, I would argue.  
 
Based on this, Ramon Quintana and the British Embassy must be said to have been the primary 
actors in the transfer of CP from the United Kingdom to Bolivia, referring to the policy transfer 
model (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). From the sender side, the experts visiting Bolivia from Northern 
Ireland would, with Dolowitz and Marsh’s terms, be called policy entrepreneurs and experts. 
Dolowitz and Marsh note that policymakers, at both national and international level, are 
increasingly relying on the advice of consultants, acting as policy experts in the development of 
new programs, policies and institutional structures. The ‘experts’ offer advice based upon what they 
regard as the best practice elsewhere, Dolowitz and Marsh argue (ibid.: 10).  The expertise from 
Northern Ireland is based on the challenges of rebuilding trust and good relationships between 
police and communities after 30 years of violent conflict, it is stated in a semi-official document 
from the British Embassy (Brit. Emb. 2010). These experts have engaged in changing the Northern 
Irish policing landscape, which has resulted in “one of the most democratically accountable 
policing organizations in the world”, according to themselves (ibid.). Based on this experience, ”a 
strategic – top down approach” including institutional change of the police was suggested by the 
British and Irish experts, to the Bolivian authorities (ibid.). I will return to the practical implications 
of this approach below and in the next chapter, and here keep focus on the formal transfer. 
 
Local men in the field also took part in the initial implementation of the CP model. The push 
forward - el empuje - of the model locally, happened thanks to Police colonel Baldivieso Iturre, 
according to Cordero (Cordero 30/10/14). Two other police coronels are mentioned as “home 
grown experts in Community Policing” by the British Embassy (Brit. Emb. 2010). I believe it is 
their position that today is taken over by my key informant from the Police, Colonel Ramiro Ruiz. 
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Even though the decision to introduce CP to Bolivia might have been dependent on few key actors 
– maybe even a few men (Quintana and the British ‘experts’) – I will not argue that it was an 
“entirely serendipitous discovery” (Dixon 2007: 172) based on one individual officer’s eagerness to 
learn from abroad as in Bill Dixon’s South African case (ibid.). Firstly, Bolivia could, in 2005, 
when the ideas of CP were presented, mirror itself in neighbouring countries, especially Colombia 
and Chile that had implemented the CP model some years earlier (PB 2014a: 35), and secondly, a 
lot indicates that the influence from UK has been rather significant.  
 
As it should be clear by now the policing model is not a Bolivian invention, rather, CP is a model 
that has travelled all over the globe, as Pattersen (2010) and Dixon (2007) also underline. I have, in 
Chapter Four, noted how international export of policing policies and security reform constitutes a 
tool for international development actors, and I would argue that CP indeed is an element of these 
security policies travelling between political systems. What have been called the international, or 
global, ‘epistemic community’ (e.g. as described by Haas 1992) thus, must also be mentioned as an 
influential – though more indirect – actor in the transfer of the new police idea and policy from the 
global to the local level.  
 
Local Needs and Wishes or Enforced Imposition? 
According to the Dolowitz and Marsh model the reasons for transfer can vary from being 
“voluntary and wish-based” to being based on needs or “coercive imposition” (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000: 9). The ‘need-approach’ seems to have been the most dominant official explanation for the 
insertion of CP in Bolivia. In the aforementioned book about the history of the Police and the 
Bolivian democracy by Ramon Quintana (et al 2003) the situation in 2003 is described as a “police 
crisis, which objectively reflects the crisis of the state and its traditional forms of legitimacy” 
(Quintana et al 2003: 6). It is further written that as no proper policy for crime control and citizen 
security existed, it “undermines confidence in the law, introduces uncertainty and fear in the 
community, and encourages a breakdown of the social contract” (ibid.). Based on this 
categorization of crisis, it is argued that a reform of the Bolivian Police is highly necessary; and not 
only the police, but the state bureaucracy and general political and juridical institutions and 
processes (ibid.: 22-23).  
 
! 35!
It is directly expressed – schematized – in the 2014 publication from the Bolivian Police, that the 
foundation and rason d’etre of CP is “lack of legitimacy of the police” (PB 2014a: 37). Criticizing 
the traditional model for being too distant to the community and too centralized (ibid.), it was now 
seen that closer contact between the police and the community would lead to re-legitimization of 
the police, and stated that: “increased police legitimacy = greater willingness to enforce laws and 
lower resistance to police work” (PB2014c: 68). In a semi-official document from the British 
Embassy the same reasoning is presented, “because the Bolivian Police Force was seen as a corrupt 
and inefficient institution […] there was a desperate need for reform” (Coloma 2013: 1).  
 
As I have noted, the CP transfer is to a large extent dominated by Anglo-Saxon ideas about 
policing, and as will later become clear, it has not been easy to establish in the Bolivian police 
force. Quintana has obviously been a local advocate for the transfer of the police model, but I would 
argue that even though the intention has been to adapt the model to the local context (PB 2014a), it 
might have been ‘too British’ for Bolivians. Colonel Ruiz was at least very clear about his opinion: 
the model “came from another culture” and the attempt to “copy it into the Bolivian context” has 
been “an error” (Ruiz 2/10/14). In general he is a great advocate for the model, but he states that it 
was a mistake to implement it before a proper diagnostic of the local problems and needs was made 
(Ruiz 21/11/14). The British Embassy experienced the initial phase of implementation to be tough, 
because of distrust and reluctance from the local police towards the model. It meant that the 
Embassy, with Adriana Cordero’s words “had to insist” on the future benefits of the model 
(Cordero 30/10/14).  
I would argue that the Bolivian authorities with the police and the British Embassy aimed at 
‘emulating’ the Anglo-Saxon – British – model and make it fit to Bolivia. But it would be wrong to 
say that this emulation has happened as a “complete transfer” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 13) as it 
might have been intended. To determine better the degree of voluntariness and adjustments made to 
fit the local context I will return to the topic in the next two analytical chapters.  
 
Now, in order to look a little closer at the Bolivian version of CP – in line with the question of 
‘what is transferred’ – I will look at the concrete strategies within the model, in order to activate and 
integrate the population in the police work. The community plays a central role in the CP model, 
and the following will address who, in the eyes of the state and the police, should form the 
community.  
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Anticipated actors and mechanisms in Bolivian Community Policing 
Generally the CP model’s effort to integrate the community builds on organizations of the 
population that were already established before 2005, indicating that those included in the official 
plan on CP are the ones forming the already established ‘organized civil society’. These are the 
juntas vecinales (neighbourhood councils), as officially established with the LPP law in 1994 and 
the School Brigades for Security and the Civil Support Groups to the Police established in the 90’s 
(Quintana et al 2003: 75, PB 2014a: 94). The Neighbourhood Security Brigades are community-
based organizations, led by the Bolivian Police in order to create a culture on public security and a 
“peaceful coexistence of communities” (PB 2014a). The components are block leaders, block plans, 
block profiles (address, telephone number, composition of household, family situation etc.), alarm 
systems and telephone trees (PB2014c: 115-117).  
 
The barrio residents themselves are to request the establishment of a security brigade from the local 
police station and nothing is forced on them (PB 2014a: 87). Thus it is anticipated that the 
communities are motivated to apply for the acknowledgement of the police to establish the security 
brigade. I argue, in line with notions of contemporary governmentality, that this motivation, or as 
Weber would say “political love” (Weber 1977, in Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 9) to the community 
of the state, is intended to be constructed through training seminars and empowerment endeavours – 
or what Garland (2001: 124) calls “persuasion”. Several platforms for this purpose are established 
within the CP model. One of these is the Citizen Security School, providing workshops on citizen 
security for local juntas vecinales and other interested citizens (PB2014a: 77-92). Another platform 
is the School Brigades for Security. These are organizations of student volunteers at primary and 
secondary school level whose objectives are to prevent, protect and provide security to all students 
from criminal activities, control of vehicular traffic in the school area and become promoters and 
multipliers of behaviour and actions that reduce insecurity factors (PB 2013a).  !
The Group of Civil Support to the Police (GACIP) is another platform for generating moral 
affection to the state. GACIP was created by the General Command of the Police in 1994 in the 
cities of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba and was later widened out as part of the national plan for CP. 
The objective is to “provide spaces in which it is aimed to encourage participants the values of 
tolerance, respect, honesty, solidarity and citizenship among others” (PB 2013b). Again, the 
discourse is based on changing values and behaviour as an inclusion mechanism into the ‘right 
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community’ of the state, I argue. The unit is mainly constituted of young volunteers as the school 
brigades, though you do not have to be a student to take part in GACIP (Ruiz 2/10/14). The 
participants are trained in police services in order to provide support to the police, it is explained 
(ibid.). So ‘ordinary people’ are retrained so they are ready to actively take part in the promotion of 
a culture of security, and as such be direct assistants of the police, in line with the philosophy of the 
CP model and state logics.  
 
Looking at the constraints and success/failure of the transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000), it has not 
during my fieldwork been held a secret from me by the Bolivian Police that the police still suffer 
great challenges with implementing CP as the fundamental working model assuring a democratic 
and effective collaboration between police and the community. It is, for example, stated, “to date 
there has been very little accomplished in regulatory rules, equipment and endowment of greater 
human resources to strengthen it [CP]” (PB 2014b: 1). According to recent inquiries (LAPOP 2014, 
ONSC 2013) as well as the many testimonies I got from residents in the hillsides of La Paz, the 
police institution is still in a legitimacy crisis today, despite the initiatives to improve police and the 
other institutions in the justice sector.  
Interim Conclusion 
The CP model was transferred from Great Britain in 2005, and is still in a process of 
implementation in Bolivia today. It came with inspiration from Ramon Quintana and his book on 
the pending democracy in Bolivia, and was funded and ‘blueprinted’ through British cooperation. 
The transfer of CP was to a large extent, by both sender and receiver side, explained as a need for 
reform, as the state and police suffered a legitimacy crisis, and based on ideological overtures of 
participatory democracy and human rights. Expertise was brought from Great Britain, mostly 
Northern Ireland, to Bolivia, in a top-down process, as they themselves put it, in which it can be 
argued that too little adaptation and too much insisting have been made. However, I have stated that 
the transfer has not resulted in a blind imitation of the British model, which will become clearer in 
the next chapters. I have argued that the Anglo-Saxon policing model aimed at bringing the police 
closer to the community can be seen as a technology of government, which is one of the points I 
will take further in the next chapters on (in)security and policing in practice.  
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Chapter 6: Local security scape: the 
police 
 
The formal translation of global ideas on CP to the Bolivian context has been presented above, 
focusing on which actors transferred what, how it has been transferred, as well as why these actors 
engaged in policy transfer. So far, I have mainly dealt with the transfer of CP on the ideational and 
formal level and indicated that it has faced challenges in practice. In the following I will focus on 
how the actual implementation of the model has taken shape when put to practice. I scrutinize the 
police/community relationship and the implications of the current picture of CP for performance of 
legitimate authority. I argue in this Chapter that the CP model has not succeeded in constructing a 
police force of ‘communitarian cops’, nor making ‘the community’ ready to participate along state 
logics of danger and security as was intended with CP. This invokes a ‘grey zone’ between public 
and private, civil and uncivil or/and between legal and illegal; a grey zone that becomes productive 
for action, which I will examine in more detail in Chapter Seven. In the following, I will sketch out 
the dynamics perpetuating the grey zone with a special focus on the police.  
The Current Picture of CP in La Paz 
During my research it was presented to me as a truism that ‘the model is not yet applied’ by a 
variety of actors (e.g. Ruiz 21/11/14), pointing to what is understood by the implementing actors as 
limited success of the implementation of CP. Many accounts indicate that the Bolivian police 
continue to suffer the crisis of legitimacy that CP was set out to solve, and that the insertion of CP 
from global to local level has left a gap between what was intended and what has become everyday 
practice. Looking at the outcomes of the plans and programs entangled in CP there is, despite gaps, 
also evidence of some accomplishments. Since its initial insertion in 2005, Bolivian police officers 
have engaged in exchange visits with Great Britain, Ireland and Colombia in order to obtain new 
experiences and perspectives (PB 2014a, PB 2012). The British embassy has financed technical 
equipment and training, and communication material such as the 132 pages long publication, The 
Community Police Model with Focus on the Working Philosophy of the Bolivian Police (PB 2014a). 
Furthermore Integrated Police Stations (EPIs) in all seven districts of La Paz and 84 smaller local 
police modules have been installed (PB 2012: 29, LaPaz.org). These physical constructions aiming 
to bring the police physically closer to the community might represent some degree of success for 
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the citizen-oriented security politics of the Bolivian government.12 However, as the Colonel Ruiz 
conveyed to me in a cheerless tone: “the accomplishments of CP are still only infrastructure, we 
still need the mentality and the structure, the technology” (Ruiz 21/11/14).  
 
The main explanation for the failures of successful implementation of CP in Bolivia, according to 
Ruiz, is that earlier police commanders13 did “an erroneous job” when they started implementing 
the community police model in 2005 (Ruiz 2/10/14). According to Adriana Cordero of the British 
Embassy, the ‘failure’ may be a result of the police’s initial lack of belief in the model. Cordero 
explained that the Bolivian Police were very hard to convince as they doubted the capabilities of the 
population to participate in police work (Cordero 30/10/14). This is why, according to Cordero, the 
British Embassy had to insist on the implementation of the model. 
 
One of the lessons from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and Bill Dixon (2007) is that the local context 
of the receiving society is pivotal for success or failure of a policy transfer. Experts basing advice 
on ‘best-practices’ elsewhere often pay little attention to the particular context in the political 
system that receive the “best practices” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 10). It could be argued that the 
”strategic – top down approach” (Emb. Brit. 2010) that was intended democratize the police, and 
solve its legitimacy crisis was formed with little attention to the Bolivian context(s). Firstly 
according to Ruiz (21/11/14), a real diagnostic of the needs was never made before the British 
Embassy implemented the plan. Secondly, it was based on the Northern Irish experiences from 30 
years of violent conflict between religious groups, which is, needless to say, a rather different 
history and context than that of Bolivian experiences. These conditions do not, at least, contradict a 
characterisation of the transfer of CP as an enforced imposition from the British Embassy in the 
name of ‘willing to improve’ (Li 2007).  
The Janus-face of the ‘Green Olived Communitarians’ 
An alternative explanation for the implementation challenges faced by CP could be found in the 
internal and historical challenges of the Bolivian police system. Ruiz has raised such critique, and 
claims that police officials (who are dressed in olive green clothes, and therefore called the ‘green 
olived’) give low priority to the lectures on CP and that they seem to “quickly forget” what they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 A politics that was initiated with the Operation Plan from 2007 (PB 2014a: 44, EPB 2013: 59), and further strengthened 
with the Citizen Security Law in 2012 (LCSSL 2012)  
13 Most likely the police chiefs who were called ‘home-grown experts’ by the British Embassy (Brit. Emb. 2010) 
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have been taught at training seminars (Ruiz 2/10/14). Another ‘transfer assistant’, Loreta Tellería, 
director at the Bolivian Observatory for Democracy and Security, confirmed this critique (Tellería 
10/11/14). In addition, several of my sources claim that there is constant rotation of personnel14 
(Cordero 30/10/14; workshop 21/10/14; see also Ungar and Arias 2012: 2). This means that the 
police do not succeed in building up a relationship of trust with local communities, as the residents 
do not meet the same policemen on a continual basis, Tellería evaluated (Tellería 10/11/14). The 
following dialogue between two residents in Tembladerani, a barrio in the hillsides of La Paz, 
illustrates well how the residents do not know what to expect of the ‘green olived’: !
Roselyn: There is no coordination between the community and the police. Why? Because the 
very police itself has made the institution look bad, there has been a lot of corruption, and then 
the citizen and the common person in the street has no confidence in the police. 
Carmen: You don’t know if the police will help you or will assault you [even] worse [than the 
criminal] 
Roselyn: or if he is going to rape you!
(Group interview, 29/10/14) 
 
The conversation captures the residents’ uncertainty in relation to the police, which is why they 
often prefer not to trust the police in general. However, the barrio residents also underline that 
“there are policemen who help you” (Ibid.), categorized as “the exception” to the rule (ibid.). These 
‘good policemen’, as my sources called them, are people they know from the neighbourhood or 
policemen they have met in different situations, such as the former local colonel in Cotahuma, Rosa 
Lema, who was “a neighbour” and always patrolled the barrio on foot (ibid.). The humble and 
“incorruptible” policeman (ibid.) - the exception to the rule - is, like the community members 
themselves, he who lives in the sparse department he is offered by the police and only just pays off 
his loans in spite of earning as the highest rank of the police (ibid.).15   
 
As I got to know Colonel Ruiz better during my fieldwork, his initial diplomatic way of describing 
the challenges within the police force changed from “there are many policemen who do not 
understand the configuration of the decentralization” (Ruiz, workshop 21/10/14), to a far more 
sceptical and critical attitude. In our last meeting he stated that half of the police force or more are 
“lost”, work in “other directions” and should go through a “brainwash laboratory” in order to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The ex-colonel in Cotahuma, Rosa Lema, was supposedly a strong advocate for the approximation to the community 
and was trained well in the new model of community police, but when she got a new position in the police, everything 
have been forgotten in Cotahuma, Ruiz believes (Ruiz 2/10/14). Rosa Lema is also seen as a big capacity by the British 
Embassy in La Paz, and described as una gran mujer (a great woman) by Adriana Cordero (Cordero 30/10/14). 
15 Not to say that the police are well paid. According to my informants they receive between 500 and 1200 USD monthly 
depending on their rank. 
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become “real community policemen” (Ruiz 21/11/14). In a similar vein, Loreta Tellería suggests 
“just because you get a diploma in Community Policing it does not mean that you end up being 
‘communitarian’” (Tellería 10/11/14). The various suggestions refer to what is a common way of 
describing and interpreting police behaviour as inserted in a “culture of corruption” (Cordero 
30/10/14) that colour all aspect of the police life and become the accepted behaviour within the 
institution of the police,16 which can presumably only be cured through a ‘brainwash’. 
 
The room to manoeuvre 
In general the attitude towards the police is negative. Different sources have suggested that in order 
to improve the police as an institution it should be eliminated and rebuilt from zero. Testimonies 
describing the common policeman given by both police leaders and community members point to a 
tendency to understand Bolivian policemen as generally lazy, disloyal and corrupt - using cunning 
ways to receive small bonuses. Furthermore, they are described as unaware and stupid, and 
sometimes they “don’t even know how to speak castellan Spanish, or how to write”, according to 
Carmen (Group interview, 29/10/14). One resident expressed his despair about police behaviour 
referring to them as failing in their paternal role of the ‘sovereign’, “in a way I see you [the police] 
as the parents to the neighbours, but despite of this […] the police are the first to break the law in all 
cases” (resident, workshop 21/10/14).  
 
Among my sources there was a general agreement that the requirements for being a policeman are 
too vague. According to Carmen, this means that even “sons of offenders, sons of assaulters” can be 
recruited (Carmen, group interview, 29/10/14). This is explained by the fact that with ‘these human 
rights today’ people cannot be discriminated, and therefore the ‘sons of offenders’ cannot be 
rejected at the police academy.17 According to Carmen, it means that the future policemen enter 
with a mentality based on what she explains with ‘a Bolivian saying’: “if you don’t take advantage 
of your uniform, you are not a real policeman” (ibid.). ‘Take advantage’ means to take liberties to 
circumvent the law, as they apparently learn at the police academy. Carmen explains: “so it’s like, 
in there you could say, you can rob, you can make assaults, you can hide, whatever kind of thing” 
(ibid.).!
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The problem with corruption has been confirmed to me several times by barrio residents and experts, and according to 
Cordero, even if they would get a better pay, the policemen would not change this culture (Cordero 30/10/14). 
17 I will return to the special notion on human rights in the discussion (Chapter Eight). 
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I have heard plenty of stories about police officers ignoring serious cases by hiding or showing up 
at the crime place without actually doing anything. Residents have also told me about how the 
police cooperate with so-called ‘trick thieves’ and make all kinds of smaller quotidian violations of 
the law. As the police is “him who manages and orders […] the maximum authority” (Resident, 
workshop 21/10/14) ‘it is difficult to teach them’, the complaint goes. In general, the experience is 
that when the police actually do show up they attend the wrong cases. Some accounts from the 
residents indicated that they only protect buildings and important people and are not present “on the 
dirt roads” and, “the hillsides have been forgotten” another resident said (workshop 21/10/14). I 
was told one particular story where the police, in the middle of a traffic accident, started inspecting 
mini-buses for papers and maintenance (resident, workshop 21/10/14), and yet another where 
officers ‘finally’ arrived in the neighbourhood, but to remove a sleeping harmless drunken man 
although “he was not bothering anybody” (Carmen, Group interview, 29/10/14).  
 
Another way of portraying what is considered police ignorance comes from Jorge, who explained to 
me how the police: 
  
wait until you are bloody all over, with broken arms, to just then make the accusation, and even 
when this happens, they disengage themselves from it all, they say ‘no, no we don’t attend this 
case… you already have the proofs, and it is only conciliations between neighbours  
(Jorge 26/1/14) 
  
Primarily, the quote highlights that the police do not react until the crime has been committed. 
However, the ‘reactive police’ was intended to disappear with the paradigm of CP (PB2014a, Ruiz 
2/10/14), but so far this has not changes sufficiently, Ruiz explained to me. According to him, 
‘being reactive’ applies to the general Bolivian population, which he proposes as an explanation for 
why reactive conduct of the police is a feature that is hard to eliminate among the police (ibid.).  
 
Secondly, the quote from Jorge presents the police as not trusting ‘suspicions’ from the people as 
‘real’ accusations. Instead, the police’s logic (interpreted by Jorge) is that if the neighbours already 
have ‘made the work’ (by having the proofs) the police would not have to attend the case (Jorge 
2014). However, as I described in the previous chapter, to a great extent CP builds on 
responsibilization and activation of the community in order to cast it as the extended arm of the 
police. In this exercise, the challenge is not to create an active participative community. I found the 
barrio residents to be very keen to act and participate. Instead, the challenge is to make policemen 
and barrio residents follow the same mental schemes for defining ‘danger’ and ‘security’. To 
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safeguard a self-governance that complements and extends the formal controls of the state, 
mechanisms of responsibilization are the proposed strategy according to the current 
governmentality-scheme inherent in the CP philosophy (Garland 2001; Dean 2010). 
Responsibilization Mechanisms 
Within the CP philosophy there is a great focus on the construction of ‘the culture of security’, 
which is based on the private responsibility to be a good citizen and create a safe atmosphere. These 
ideas are reflected in the following statement from Ruiz “Security, well, it is not only […] the 
responsibility of the police, it is also, it starts with the very person. In the way, in this promotion of 
the culture of security, we see our behaviours, our conduct” (Ruiz, workshop 21/10/14).  
Various police documents stress that for CP to succeed in creating security a shift of mentality and 
behaviour is needed among the policemen as well as among the population (PB 2014a, PB 2013b); 
and the special focus on the activation of the citizen is explained by the reasoning that, firstly, 
without the people, there is no police (workshop 21/10/14), and secondly, that the neighbour knows 
best the people living in his street and “whether they work or not, if they are involved in any 
suspect activities” (EPB 2013: 60). This is an example of the responsibilization of public 
management from the state to the communities as a technology of contemporary governmentality. I 
argue, in line with Dixon (2007) and Seri (2012), that by decentralizing state agency the state gets 
new possibilities to maintain – or recapture – fields of governance at risk of being ‘lost’ to private 
actors.  
 
Along this focus on ‘the joint responsibility’ a certain ‘customer-seller discourse’ can be traced. 
Bolivian police mention in their documents and presentations that the new paradigm of policing 
includes a new understanding of the community as ‘the client’. The active citizen ‘knows what he 
wants’ and has better information than before (PB 2013b). This community of active citizen(s) 
should ‘be understood as the consumer of our service’, it continues (ibid.), and the official discourse 
can be exemplified as, “the Police is to see the community as the client and not as something below 
their control; to which it is expected, in the end, that a co-production of security is produced in 
collaboration with community” (EPB 2013: 46).  
The ‘client-discourse’ resonates with the understanding from Dean (2010) that the ‘new 
prudentialism’ responsibilizes the citizen to provide for himself and to demand as a user and 
consumer of (public) services (Dean 2010: 194). In this way, it follows the logic of privatization of 
security as Abrahamsen and Williams have described (2011) where the citizen is understood as a 
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consumer of security. However, in Bolivian CP the western bias of production of ‘the individual’ is 
set aside for production of ‘the community’, or “the community as the client” as it is termed in a 
publication from the Bolivian Ministry of Government on Citizen Security (EPB 2013: 46). 
However, in the particular case of the hillsides of La Paz, ‘the community’ represents a group of 
urban poor who do not have resources to hire private security guards. So they depend on the state’s 
capability and willingness to ‘serve’ them and collaborate, if they are not to take the law in their 
own hands. However, it is strongly underlined by the police that the ‘client’ is a co-producer of 
security; the people should participate actively in the creation of a ‘culture of security’ and educate 
their children to become virtuous citizens who do not consume alcohol disrespectfully, drive with 
five people on a motorbike, or forget to use the sidewalk when walking in the streets (workshop 
21/10/14). 
 
Through the Citizen Security Schools (PB 2014a) community members are to learn to be good and 
active citizens, educate their children to be the same, and get an understanding of the programs and 
laws on social control (LPCS 2013). The citizens are to be engaged to keep an eye on all suspicious 
elements and denounce strange movements (ibid.). These mechanisms inherent in the CP model are, 
as previously mentioned, voluntary and should be initiated by request from the residents themselves 
(PB2014c: 115-117). As Rose has noted in a similar vein, “government of security here operates 
through the activation of individual commitment, energies and choices, through personal morality 
within a community setting” (Rose 2000: 329). Through the freedom of the citizens to choose 
between different security-offers, they are to be governed to ‘do the right thing’ (see also Dean 
2010). It could be argued that the citizen security schools’ aim is the production of an active 
citizenry who ‘shops security correctly’ and as a result feels in collaboration with the police, 
motivated by their personal morality within the community. 
 
It is stated in police documents and by Ruiz that the same need for change of behaviour is needed 
among the policemen. As I have already outlined, a community policeman should be present in the 
community, proactive, problem-solving, and ‘give a little extra’ (Ruiz 2/10/14). 
Paradoxically, despite of efforts from the Bolivian and British authorities to establish a ‘culture of 
security’, the policemen are the ones who need a ‘brainwash’, according to Ruiz. Asking the barrio 
residents, the policemen entail the same unstable character as the criminal; you do not know 
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whether they will attend the case, whether they will ignore it, or whether they will turn out to be the 
offender. 
 
Police: law enforcers or law offenders? 
In connection, a concrete experience of the police ‘running from their obligations’ was recounted to 
me by Marcos, the Head of the Committee for Social Control in Cotahuma. His story goes:  
  
Marcos: They sent us two/three police guards for a population of 20.000 inhabitants. […] So 
there was a robbery. And there were four offenders, so the police did not come out. Because 
they knew they would kill them, or beat them obviously, so the neighbours went out ‘where is 
the police?!?!’. The police were hiding. 
(Marcos, 24/1/14) 
 
Not only does this quote tell us something about the lack of authority of the police in the situation - 
the police are afraid that their sovereignty to decide over the life and death of the criminals is turned 
around against them. I also believe it illustrates that the police fear that the possible gathering of 
furious barrio residents would develop into a mob, who could end up inciting lynch-violence and 
‘confusing’ the police with the offenders, as has happened elsewhere in Bolivia (El Espectador 
2012). Agamben suggests that those taking on the role of ‘cop’ or ‘executor’ slowly show their 
“original proximity to the criminal” (Agamben 2000: 106,7). Possessing the sovereign position they 
know that “they may be treated as criminals one day by their colleagues” (ibid.). To the barrio 
residents in Cotahuma the policemen are indeed close to the criminal: not only do police call the 
thieves by nicknames and have breakfast and hang out the same place as them, but they also work 
together with the anti-sociales in order to split the stolen goods between them (Group interview, 
29/10/14).  According to Carmen and her fellow neighbours from Tembladerani it is the very police 
that create insecurity. The uncertainty, which I argue is the most feared, lies in the fact that the 
resident never knows if the cop will help her or rape her. 
 
Interim Conclusion 
In exploring police practice ten years after the inception of CP in La Paz, I have found that the 
police force has not been constructed as a proactive, collaborative, yet sovereign police as it was 
intended on paper. The model was developed and implemented from outside the Bolivian cultural 
context, and the police were unconvinced about its potential from the very beginning and seemingly 
remain so. Instead, the typical policeman is portrayed as untrustworthy, Janus-faced, and could just 
as well turn out to be a criminal as he could be a helpful policeman.  Therefore the barrio residents 
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do not consider it ‘meaningful’ to wait for help from the police, and they must therefore find other 
security alternatives in the grey zone between law and illegality. 
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Chapter 7. The local security scape: the 
community  
 
The following chapter is concerned with the community reactions to the perceived absence of the 
police. I present how the barrio residents work in the interface between being active citizens 
following the instructions of the CP model and vigilantes judging criminals by their own means and 
thereby enacting stately activities in informal ways. What stands out is that ‘the community’ is not 
behaving as ‘the active citizens’ as was intended with CP. Instead, the local responses to the 
perceived incapacity of the police portray a distinct character of ‘the active community’ at odds 
with the intentions of the global circulating blueprint for action promulgated by the ideology of CP. 
In that sense, the grey zone between law and illegality comes into play in many, often contradictory, 
ways. Firstly, I will take a brief look at what constitutes insecurity for the barrio residents. 
Secondly, I will explore the ways the community seeks to manage insecurity. 
Neighbourhood insecurity 
  
 “We do not feel safe, not in any sense of what citizen security is, and here in the hillsides it is 
even worse, we do not feel safe because in the pure daylight we suffer theft, assaults, this has 
for us nothing to do with citizen security”  
(Resident of Llojeta, workshop 21/10/14)    
This was the answer, when one courageous hillside resident broke the silence after Colonel Ruiz 
asked the participants at the workshop in October 2014, if someone could give a definition of 
citizen security.18 The reply indicates what I suggest is (fear of) a type of polyvalent crime, that is at 
one time omnipresent and at the same time hard to determine for the barrio residents. The 
uncertainty of not knowing precisely what and who could be dangerous is forming the everyday life 
in the urban periphery of La Paz. Crime records range from robberies, alcoholism, public and 
domestic violence, drugs, corruption, bad management of trash, huge traffic problems, human 
trafficking etc. (LAPOP 2014 and ONSC 2013). The accounts from my sources confirm this 
tendency, though for the barrio residents it tends to get mixed up and unified in what Roselyn 
repeated several times in our interview: “there is a lot of ‘anti-social” (Group interview, 29/10/14). 
Roselyn transforms the anti-social, which normally refers to a feature of a person, into a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ruiz approved how this understanding of security – as insecurity in this case – is what is considered as ‘the subjective 
security’, or the perception of security (see also Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
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phenomenon, which there ‘is a lot of’ where she lives. The dangers are those factors and persons 
that work against ‘the social’ (the community), and could practically be anything or anybody.  
 
However, alcoholism, robbery and theft seem to be the most prevalent concerns among the barrio 
residents. The ‘dangerous’ are often referred to as los ladrones (the thieves) and los anti-sociales 
(the anti-socials). All over the hillsides of La Paz (and El Alto where it is even more frequent) you 
see dolls hanging from lampposts, often with the text “thief will be burned alive”. In a description 
of Pasankeri, the neighbourhood president Gonzalo Choque, said that due to very little presence of 
policemen, “it is difficult, because then, the thieves… we are without control there. It is a huge 
problem right now. This with the thieves” (Gonzalo 26/1/14). Fearing theft means being afraid of 
loosing material acquisitions that the inhabitants have worked hard to be able to buy; house 
robberies could put families back into a situation of poverty. Meanwhile, the uncertainty of risks 
and dangers as experienced by the hillside residents can also be reflected in the residents’ fear of 
alcoholics. All residents I asked mentioned alcoholism as a huge problem in their neighbourhood 
and believe that the many local semi-clandestine bars and cantinas should be closed19. I suggest that 
the alcoholics represent well the uncertainty of danger that is the most feared. You can never be 
sure about an alcoholic’s behaviour, and only in “their light moments” are they harmless and 
faithful, Roselyn explained to me (Group interview, 29/10/14). According to Ruiz, the uncertain 
character is a common feature of the general Bolivian: “the Bolivian is not a solid and firm person. 
It is changing” (Ruiz 2/10/14).  
The uncertainty is also encapsulated in Carmen’s distrust towards ‘new’ neighbours, which she 
explains with: “because, we’ll see, they could be aggressive?” The question is then how the 
residents try to manage this uncertainty and insecurity, which I will now address. 
 
Managing Insecurity 
The CP model is based on the rationale that barrio residents organize themselves to carry out patrols 
and do general security work as the so-called Neighbourhood Security Brigades established in 
coordination with the police (PB2014a). However, the residents of Cotahuma experience another 
reality in their neighbourhoods. According to them, the police do not keep their promises and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Risør (2010b) opens her PhD thesis with a big event in El Alto where community associations in a riot-style closed 
down a range of bars and cantines, demanding citizen security and new municipal laws for better control of the 
consuption of alcohol.  
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agreements, and can suddenly appear to be affiliated with criminal activities of various types, as 
already mentioned. At times the ‘communitarians’ even engage in repressive hard hand policing 
methods, opposite to the philosophy of CP, which is focused on prevention and partnerships with 
the public. An example of a repressive method was seen during the massive police operation “Plan 
Chachapuma”, initiated by the General Commando of the Police in 201320. The uncertainty of the 
character of the police results in reactions of different kinds of despair and frustration among the 
neighbourhood residents: some are furious and others are more pragmatic. What seems to be 
common among the residents is a general confusion, as I also indicated above in the section 
describing ‘the Janus-face’ of the police. Sometimes, this results in a silencing of the problems as 
some people ‘shut up’ and do not report to the police21 (Group interview, 29/10/14). On the other 
hand, others choose to take on the job of policing themselves. I will now narrow in on how the 
residents manage (in)security in a constant balancing act between following the ideas of order and 
justice of the state and establishing their own order and justice.  
 
The Community Responses to Uncertainty and Confusion 
According to the three residents of Tembladerani, the use of civil patrol is the only alternative, now 
that the police control “makes no sense” (Roselyn, ibid.): 
 
Juan: I tell you, [civil patrolling is] the only alternative, the only alternative here, because if we 
wait for police help we wait in vain, being very sincere. 
Roselyn: I also think so, because they run from the control. Due to lack of resources, we know 
that […]. But it does not give the right, nor the place for the citizens to endure so much violence 
(Group interview, 29/10/14) 
 
The logic is that as the police do not comply with their job, the barrio residents themselves have to 
establish order. This is a common attitude among the community members. What is also interesting 
is that Roselyn uses the word ‘right’ (derecho); the lack of resources of the police ‘does not give 
right’ to ‘so much violence’. Instead it becomes ‘right’ that the residents take on the task of 
patrolling. 
 
Another account from a community member gives an example of how the community members act 
when they meet a ‘suspect’. Gonzalo, the president of the neighbourhood council in Tembladerani 
walks me through their ‘police-like’ activity,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 In 2013 the police executed close to 400,000 operations, which resulted in the arrest of 43,288 people, in 215 days of 
continuous operation in order to establish public order in high-crime zones (La Razon 7/6/13, see also Derpic 2014: 13). 
21 Not reporting crimes is widespread in Bolivia. In 2012 85% of the victims did not report the crime, according to a 
survey (http://www.la-razon.com/ciudades/victimas-delitos-denuncia-Policia_0_1559244082.html)  
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Barely seeing someone suspicious, or someone who, I don’t know… is standing for a long time, 
then he is approached and asked, ‘lets hear, who are you looking for?’ [Then] he doesn’t know 
what to answer and suspiciously, for example, [the residents tell him] ‘leave before the 
neighbours come out’ 
(Gonzalo 26/1/14) 
 
By using the threat of a mob of people that could resort to lynch violence as a punishment for 
‘standing there and being suspicious’, Gonzalo assures that this kind of stranger does not come back 
to his neighbourhood. The threat is also symbolized in the use of the whistle, as Juan told me. The 
reasoning goes that if all neighbours blow the whistle (demonstrating with sound the ‘mass’ of the 
people) when a stranger enters the neighbourhood then the message will be sent that he has entered 
a well-organized community and he will not come back (Group interview, 29/10/14). Demarcating 
‘organized community’ by whistling becomes the instrument to create a sense of security. An 
imagination of security that is, I would suggest, based on the sensation of community, of feeling 
like a member of ‘the social’. The whistle in this sense comes to be the object that connects two 
essential values for the barrio residents ‘security’ and ‘community’.  
 
The blurriness of ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ 
On hearing Marcos’ story about the policemen who hid because they were too few to tackle a group 
of thieves (as I presented on page 45) I asked how he and his neighbours reacted. He answered, 
“well, we organized ourselves with the police […], so that they could assemble a working group 
[…] we distributed whistles” (Marcos 24/1/14). The working group he mentions might be what is 
called, in official police terms, Neighbourhood Brigades for Security, and the whistle is also a 
proposed tool in the community police model (PB 2014a). However, it is paradoxical that for the 
duration of my fieldwork, when visiting and talking with barrio residents and police, I was not able 
to see or hear of any concrete examples of the police and neighbours actually patrolling together – 
only descriptions in a few news articles from 2012 and 201322. As far as I know, Marcos’ 
interpretation of the ‘working group’ being a product of the organization with the police has never 
been put to practice. Most barrio residents stress that there is no collaboration with the police. On 
one occasion the presidents of the neighbourhood councils of Cotahuma succeeded in establishing 
an appointment with the local colonel to do a night patrol, but she never showed up, they grumbled 
(Ampliado, 7/10/14). The residents saw it as another breach of trust and they have not tried to set up 
a patrol again with her, they told me. The fact that Marcos refers to their activity as being ‘with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 e.g. Vecinos Vigilantes, La Razon 18/8/13, Urbanización "Paraíso" es la segunda en iniciar patrullajes vecinales, La 
Patria 3/12/12 
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police’ says something about the framework within which the barrio residents imagine possible 
security techniques, and maybe even considering which would seem most legitimate. The ideas 
about how to do security work do normally not appear out of the blue23. Even though civil policing 
or vigilante-like behaviour is a product of the (perceived) absence of the state, the state’s proposed 
techniques (inspired by more global repercussions) still frame the local imagination, I believe. The 
state’s laws are operating powerfully, even in the peripheral barrios of Cotahuma. State law 
normally operates by imposing its own perception and scheme of order, which is also argued by 
Goldstein (2012). However in this case, it is a scheme that does not necessarily comply with the 
logic of the barrio residents. I agree with Goldstein when he proposes that this ambivalent 
inconsistency positions ‘law’ and ‘illegality’ in blurry boundaries. When the barrio residents try to 
establish security following ‘their’ scheme of order by utilizing the language and symbols of the 
state (Gupta 1995) it is given legitimacy and legality, even if it might be working on the margins of 
the law. It is interesting that despite the fact that the residents perceive the state as inefficient, they 
generate state-like proposals as answers to the problems they believe that the same state’s 
incapacity creates.  
 
Being a Good Citizen: Operating Between State Laws and Illegal Activities 
In some way, the barrio residents seem to be aware of how they can use the space that they are 
given through the CP in a productive way. A sequence from the interview with the residents of 
Tembladerani provides an example: 
 
Juan: now, look, I tell you, and this is true, what do the police say? ‘Organize yourself!’ […]!
Roselyn: There are people who want to take the justice into their own hands because there is no 
trust in the police. There is none now.!
Juan: we have been in many seminars where the police have told us very clearly to organize 
ourselves. […]!
Roselyn: what does that tell you? ‘Organize as neighbours’, that’s like, ‘make your own justice, 
because the police can’t’!
(Group interview, 29/10/14) !
Roselyn expresses an attitude that I have encountered several times at community meetings: when 
the police have shown that they are not capable of taking on the task, it is asked why the police then 
do not just ‘empower’ the barrio residents so that they have the agency to ‘do it’ (workshop 
21/10/14). The barrio residents do not themselves refer to this as taking the law into their own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As Tessa Diphoorn and Rita Abrahamsen underlined in their presentations on a seminar on Private Security at DIIS 
28/5/14 
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hands, which I believe can be explained by the fact that it is usually understood to imply direct 
violence or even killings. Later in the group interview, Roselyn and her fellow hillside residents 
underline that the method of their neighbours in El Alto, who use lynch violence as punishment to 
intruders, is a crime and should not happen. However, they also state that sometimes ‘self-defence’ 
(as ‘doing it yourself’) is the only way to manage insecurity. When I asked where the limit lies for 
self-management of law enforcement they answered “there is none now” (Group interview, 
29/10/14), though in this case they seemed to want to describe current practice rather than 
demarcate their own normative stand on the matter. 
 
Gonzalo, neighbourhood president of Pasankeri, and Jorge, president in Tembladerani, were the 
ones who drew the clearest limit of all my sources, though even this limit lay in a grey zone 
between state law and illegality, I argue. Gonzalo’s distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
behaviour became clear when he explained me what he learned at one of the workshops on Citizen 
Security he attended24. At the workshop they were taught “how to defend ourselves, how to avoid, 
how should I explain you…”, and after a rather long pause for thought he continued, “once upon a 
time… delinquents have been killed in Pasankeri” (Gonzalo 26/1/14). This they have to learn to 
avoid, he argued. Jorge also condemned lynch-violence, stating clearly that “here, we don’t 
participate like that” after explaining how a lynching happens ‘up there’ (El Alto). Lynching had 
happened ‘before’, both neighbourhood presidents stated, “with the excuse of being in self defence” 
(ibid.).  
 
The method Gonzalo and his neighbours use today, which they perceive as following guidance from 
the authorities and the formal politics on citizen security, is described by Gonzalo as “so in this way 
we pass around here with whistles, signals, we all come out to capture him, he is beaten up (dan 
paliza) and handed in” (ibid.). I believe this quote exemplifies well the grey zone I am trying to 
classify. On the one hand Gonzalo wants to express that they, as active citizens, are now on ‘the 
right track’: before they killed criminals as they still do in El Alto, now they work with the police – 
or at least they follow some official police procedures. On the other hand Gonzalo and his 
neighbours still judge and punish (by beating up the offender), which happens before the criminal 
then is handed over to the police. As a group of outraged neighbours confronting danger and risks, 
they believe it is right – or at least necessary – to define what is crime and what is order before the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 He attended a workshop organized by the municipal government with the police, thus he is not referring to the 
workshop that I partly organized in October.  
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police give their judgement.25 This becomes a way for the community members to take control and 
manage uncertainty, ‘discipline’ the suspicious and anti-sociales, to make sure that they do not 
return to the barrio. Once the barrio residents have marked right and wrong in their territory it is up 
to the police to do their ‘bureaucracy’.26 As far as I know, the residents have never been captured by 
the police – or condemned by the community - when they have beaten up a criminal. Rather, it 
seems to be blueprinted as the proper management of crime informally.  
 
Here we see how barrio residents become the ones who invoke a state of exception, in which they 
can decide over the life of the offender as an informal sovereign with impunity. When this happens, 
the sovereign position of the state and its police, as the sole beholder of the monopoly on force, is 
defied. As Ole Wæver (2011) suggests, determining something as a security matter can set aside the 
otherwise existing standards invoking a kind of state of exception. Here, behaviour bypassing ethics 
or the line of the law can be justified. This could partly be helped by claiming ‘the right’ to security, 
as Chatterjee would propose as a method for ‘the political society’ who at times trespass the law “to 
live and work” (Chatterjee 2004: 40). Negotiating ‘rights’ with state entities can become a way for 
this ‘marginal’ group to legitimize their extra-legal activities as temporary until the state takes on its 
“obligation to look after the poor” (ibid.). Another factor that proves productive in this regard is 
collective fear, which I will now discuss.  
 
The Productivity of Fear and Insecurity  
It has already been made clear that the uncertainty of not knowing the character of people around 
the neighbourhood contributes greatly to the barrio residents’ feelings of insecurity. For residents, 
the police could immediately turn out to be just as treacherous as the thieves, and you never know if 
a neighbour or the local alcoholic could turn out to be aggressive. It creates an underlying and 
constant ‘always be aware and alert’-discourse, which is furthered among neighbours as well as by 
the police itself. An example of this is the statement from a police document used for training in 
CP, warning that “the threats are constant […] we never know the capacity of the persons until the 
day they hurt us, I tell you, the enemy never sleeps, and we always have it closer to us than we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 It should be noted here, that in Risør’s (2010b) encounter with the community police in El Alto, the limit for legitimate 
self-defense, as described by the police, was drawn between beating up the criminal and lynching him, ”you can beat 
him, but not kill him” (p. 126) as it was said. 
26 Tessa Diphoorn noted in her presentation on Twilight Policing, at a DIIS seminar on private security at DIIS 28/5/14, 
how that practice has been utilized South Africa, referring to her experiences with private security guards there 
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imagine” (PB 2009). It is noteworthy how the words ‘us’ and ‘them’ are used to unite police and 
community in common front against ‘the dangerous’. In this discourse, ‘community’ becomes that 
of the police-public partnership, who in union promotes a ‘culture of security’. This, however, does 
not echo with the experience of the residents, as already presented. Different strategies to manage 
the insecurity are proposed in police documents: not to take the same route to the job every day, 
keep sound and light on in the house when being out, and in general to be alert of any strange 
movement (ibid.). Talking with the barrio residents it became evident that these strategies are 
actually, to a great extent, utilised. Since ‘the enemy is always closer than you think’ as the police 
themselves state, and ‘the enemy’ is not a permanent feature of anybody, one day the policeman 
himself could be deemed the criminal. In this sense Agamben might be right about the risky 
position of the sovereign, in that one day they may be treated as criminals themselves (Agamben 
2000: 106,7).   
 
When fear and insecurity become visible and turn into a kind of ‘moral panic’, new measures for 
security are demanded. Seri (2012) suggests that more police control, ‘hard hand’ politics and 
surveillance often become the proposed treatment. The self-expanding, self-validating and self-
perpetuating character of ‘security’ in this sense results in ‘security’ installing itself with its own 
autonomy, Seri argues (ibid.: 59). That is how security mechanisms become techniques of 
governance, in which communities are made organisable and governable. In this sense, as with the 
modern state in general, Seri argues with reference to Foucault, “the criminal is quintessential to 
justify the apparatuses devoted to fighting him” (ibid.: 57). Referring to her study of security in 
Argentina, she states that the fear of the criminal makes repressive behaviour of police tolerable for 
the population. My argument is that these same mechanisms that can legitimize police repression 
are at play among the Bolivian neighbourhood organizations, though working differently and with 
ends of opposite nature. I will now develop this idea further. 
 
Fear and insecurity as constitutive for extra-legal practice 
As fear of crime has the capability to legitimize state control, I argue that it can also justify extra-
legal types of control and punishment. First, the police represent, for the barrio residents, a part of 
the security threat, rather than the safeguard for security. Second, in ‘fighting the criminal’ the 
experience is that the police are absent (in that they do not show up or do not resolve the dispute). 
Through a common (indirect) agreement of the condemnation of the police as the actor who can 
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solve community problems and decrease delinquency, self-policing with or without violent means 
becomes tolerated and justified. Carmen, resident of Tembladerani, gives the following reasoning: 
 
Carmen: Before, I am talking about 20 years ago, the barrio was a very calm zone. You didn’t 
hear about robberies, you didn’t hear about assaults. Sadly and unfortunately […] the police 
came and the assaults of the houses began.  
 
When asked whether lynching is a crime or a solution to the problems faced by the barrio, Carmen 
and her neighbour stated that ‘it is a crime’, but added: 
 
Carmen: But maybe, at the same time, they [the ‘lynchers’] liberate us from… a thief. 
Roselyn: they are liberating us 
Carmen: they are liberating us of all… that is why that justice is sometimes applied […] 
Obviously the police should take care of this... if the police is already overrun, what should be 
done? Just defend yourself, do it in self-defence. There is no other way. That is the problem. 
(Group interview, 29/10/14) 
 
So despite the fact that they see lynching as a crime, they accept it and highlight how they benefit 
from it. They also underline that there is, in practice, no limit between the law and the lynch-
violence. As already outlined, the barrio residents in the hillsides of La Paz are afraid of thieves 
entering their neighbourhoods. I argue that the collective fear, which is nurtured through media and 
public discourses, as well as daily small talk in the communities, form part of the justification of 
violence as it has the ability to establish a self-referential logic that can lead to a “state of 
exception” (Agamben 1998: 53). In this state of exception happens what could be called a 
‘securitization’ (Wæver 2011) of quotidian community life. Walking in the streets of the barrio, 
meeting up in a central square, even being in your house becomes ‘a security matter’. I argue that 
such a securitization appears to be a productive force for actions on the frontiers of the state, as the 
‘usual’ ethical standards are put aside temporarily. And I would suggest that CP is intriguingly 
adding to this fear of crime, instead of removing it.  
 
Being concerned barrio residents, willing to organize and take considerable measures to establish 
order and safety in their community, the neighbourhood residents are involved in a continual 
negotiation and contestation over what is morally correct conduct and what is not; what is 
legitimate exercise of authority and what is not (see also Buur and Jensen 2004: 145 for a similar 
point). As these boundaries are neither stable nor very clear-cut – not even for the Cotahuma 
residents - ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, in this informal practice, becomes a question of the actual case and 
does not necessarily follow any written rules. This ambivalence makes up part of the grey zone in 
which the citizens slowly becomes ‘performers of sovereignty’.  
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I argued in Chapter Three that by measures of inclusion and exclusion – which is what the law can 
do – state sovereignty is made effective (see also Goldstein 2012). In the following I will explore 
how the local communities make use of the same mechanisms, and in that way perform a central 
activity of sovereignty.  !
Construction of Community as an Activity of Sovereign Power 
Sovereignty and citizenship build, as I presented in chapter three, to a large extent on factors of 
inclusion and exclusion. According to the governmentality scheme of the state, those “yet not fit for 
citizenship” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 8-9) should be educated and empowered in order to be 
(re)integrated in the lawful society of democratic citizens. Persons on the margins of the state, who 
are often perceived as in danger of becoming criminals (or participants in violent mobs), are to be 
made ready for receiving duties and rights through sensibilization and ritualization (ibid.). The 
Bolivian state is no exception here; the Law on Popular Participation from 1994 aimed to include 
those who were earlier excluded, mainly the indigenous rural communities, by giving them rights 
and responsibilities to take part in national politics and administration of public goods (Postero 
2007: 123-163).27 The CP model indeed contains mechanisms of training according to state logics, 
such as The School for Citizen Security as already mentioned. However, when looking at policing in 
the hillsides of La Paz, contradicting ideas of order, expressions of citizenship and claims to 
sovereignty are at play.  
 
I argue that the state’s efforts to produce an active citizenry (as that of consumers who are also co-
producers of security) necessary for the implementation of CP have been shown to have the 
‘unintended consequence’ that a distinct community is produced. This community works if not 
against then on the margins of the state in the grey zone between law and illegality. Furthermore, 
this ‘community’ is produced by means of the same forms of inclusion/exclusion and expulsion 
mechanisms as those on which state law operates. The ones who become excluded from the barrio 
community are primarily the anti-sociales. Suggestions have been to place these in rehabilitation 
centres if that were available in Bolivia (Group interview, 29/10/14). According to the barrio 
residents, since there are no rehabilitation centres, the anti-sociales should at least be taken away !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 This special focus on inclusion of indigenous communities should be seen in combination with the growing focus on 
multiculturalism as a central part of Bolivian nationalism, which has been further strengthened with Evo Morales in 2005. 
The type of nationalism that is currently celebrated in Bolivia praises to large extent multiculturalism and an anti-western 
and post-colonial identity (see Postero 2007). 
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from the public spaces of the barrios, if not by the police then by being scared away by whistles and 
the hanging dolls of the communities. Furthermore, the excluded become the mistrustful 
neighbours. These are often the ‘new’ neighbours, people who are experienced to come to the barrio 
in large streams currently due to migration. These could, according to the residents of 
Tembladerani, be aggressive (Group interview, 29/10/14).  
 
Carmen divides the barrio residents in two categories: “cooperative people, and people who are not 
interested” (ibid.: Carmen). The cooperative neighbours are the ones who come out and “help even 
if it is with a stick” (ibid.), while the others ‘close their curtain’ and are unlikely to help you if you 
need it (ibid.). The same complaint was presented by some of the participants at the workshop in 
October, mostly by council leaders who had experienced that the council members only engage 
when a thief has already committed the crime. Until then, they do not care and as soon as their 
‘basic needs’ are met, they become ‘apathetic’, two council leaders argue. They put that type of 
neighbour in the same category as that of the residents of Zona Sur, the rich part of La Paz 
(workshop 21/10/14). Roselyn believes that these ‘ignorant’ neighbours often do not engage in 
community affairs because they have a history with the police, and as with the ‘new’ neighbours, 
they ‘could be aggressive’ as “we don’t know what kind of neighbour they are” (ibid.). Therefore, 
Carmen concludes, ‘they are very few, those who can organize’ (ibid.).!
 
Moral community between force and affection 
As it becomes difficult to mobilize the residents “to do things” (ibid.), the community leaders try to 
put pressure on those fellow neighbours who are on the risk of becoming a ‘mistrustful neighbour’ 
or even an anti-social. Gonzalo explained to me that sometimes the neighbourhood councils 
confront the ‘problematic neighbours’ to try to make them change their behaviour and follow 
(“negotiate” Gonzalo calls it) community norms (Gonzalo 26/1/14). In this way, I argue that the 
community leaders take on the job of re-integration of ‘those not ready for citizenship’ as a social 
worker of the state would council and educate problem-makers. Furthermore the community leaders 
have tried to implement mechanisms of compulsion to make the residents engage and take part. One 
possibility is to give fines, or even to take away the land of the neighbours who do not take part in 
three community activities in a row, Jorge told me in January 2014 (Jorge 26/1/14). He assures me 
that this is currently applied in El Alto, and ‘before’ was also applied in his barrio in the hillside. He 
indirectly adds that this makes it difficult for the neighbours not to show up at an eventual act of 
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lynching; people feel forced to participate, as the community has established lynching as the norm 
and the correct way to punish an offender.  
 
Currently, in my case in the hillsides of La Paz, the enforced active citizenship is more subtle and 
has more to do with engagement in planning of investments and development of the infrastructure 
of the barrio. As the communities receive public funds according to the annual plan they themselves 
design, it is important that a broad section of the neighbourhood participates in the workshops on 
‘how to make an annual operational plan’. Marcos warned at a community meeting that if the 
residents do not show up, their claims to new equipment will not be considered and they will not 
receive anything the following year (Ampliado, 7/10/14). This might work as a way to create active 
community members, using similar techniques inherent in a state’s efforts to construct active 
citizenship. Sian Lazar (2006) and Helene Risør (2010b) both point out how the term vecino 
(neighbour) becomes a collective identity, and Risør in particular notes how the collective activity 
of generating security, often by violent means, entails a grounded notion of citizenship in Bolivia. 
 
In line with Risør – who studied ‘neighbourhoodness’ in El Alto and not La Paz - I argue that 
through self-policing, as we see it in the hillsides of La Paz, ‘community’ is reiterated and ’active 
neighbours’ become the new legitimate authority. Buur and Jensen (2004) similarly suggest in their 
article on South Africa, ”[t]he continual practices of everyday policing are what constitute the 
formation of the moral community, which is the basis for the production of localised sovereignty 
and authority” (ibid.: 146). I argue that being considered a vecino in the hillsides of La Paz really 
means being included in the community of barrio-life in the urban periphery. The community that 
they share builds on solidarity and the collective feeling of being left ‘without control’ by the state. 
Based on that sense of community, they can defy their position in the ‘periphery’ and confront the 
state as a “social front of neighbours” (resident, workshop, 21/10/14).28 According to the barrio 
residents I have interviewed, they can only trust themselves and their neighbours. The ‘bad 
neighbours’ are either excluded or motivated to change behaviour to one that fits community norms, 
as ‘community’ and ‘security’ become mutually constitutive. The neighbours who choose to ‘close 
the curtains’ instead of collaborating fall outside of the community and instead become a part of the 
problem as they show their proximity to the anti-social.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 During my fieldwork many of the neighbours from Cotahuma were organizing a new political party with the name 
Movimiento Social Vecinal in opposition to the government party of Evo Morales, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). They 
wish to run for municipal elections in March 2015. 
! 59!
As Hansen and Stepputat (2005) have presented, modern sovereign power needs bodies and ‘bare 
life’ to manifest itself (ibid.: 31). In that way the community of good citizens also needs ‘the other’; 
the dangerous, the anti-social, to mark its boundaries. Who becomes included and who then can be 
excluded is a result of the constant definition and negotiation of the law, right and norms – whether 
following state logics or community logics.  
 
Alongside state actions, on the frontier of the state, the ‘ordinary citizens’ organize to maintain law 
and order on behalf of their communities. As a type of vigilantes – and not anarchists (see 
Abrahams 2007: 423) – they are critical of the state’s actual performance, though not of the 
existence of the state itself. They do not wish to directly fight the state; instead they find it 
necessary to do ‘something’ to combat the lack of control. As ‘collective bodies’ that are partly 
produced by the absence of the state, they both mimic and substitute the state at the same time 
(Kotonias 2009: 6). In this sense, as vigilantes they are also pragmatic and humble community 
members, working on the margins of the law in necessity, more than in direct opposition, deploying 
all available resources that look like state practices and maintaining a legitimacy blueprint. As with 
Chatterjee’s political society, the barrio residents at times see it necessary to cross the law to ‘live 
and work’ (Chatterjee 2004: 40). Abrahams calls the arena in which this takes place ‘an awkward 
borderland between law and illegality’ (Abrahams 2007: 422), or what Chatterjee calls ‘a nebulous 
zone’ (Chatterjee 2004: 50), which resemble what I have called ‘a grey zone’. This grey zone is not 
only constantly produced, but also productive as it is creating a space for action in which the 
Bolivian police and local communities can perform social control, and struggle to make life less 
insecure for themselves, their families and their neighbourhood. 
 
Interim Conclusion 
As the residents of Cotahuma experience that they are ‘without control’ (Jorge) since they cannot 
afford private security and the police are not doing their job, they begin to organize themselves in 
neighbourhood watch schemes (as they are also told to do by the police). They utilize whistles as 
alarm systems, they perform a kind of social community work to re-integrate problematic 
neighbours and they threat and sometimes beat up the anti-sociales. The CP aims to activate and 
responsibilize the citizens to do police work in collaboration with the police, but the residents do 
not experience sufficient police collaboration. Instead, the police represent the same uncertainty as 
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any other dangerous character. It is therefore justified to organize as neighbours and take on, in 
subtle ways, the role as the new sovereign.  
 
Agamben reminds us how the sovereign position is constituted by the ethical discretion to define in 
each case ‘violence’ and ‘security’ in a complex framework of laws and norms. The punishment – 
or even killing – without ritual of the ‘bare life’ of Homo Sacer, inhabited by those who is 
considered to behave as an ‘anti-social’, happens in a sphere of the sovereign decision. This 
decision suspends law in the state of exception that at the same time constitutes those who take the 
law into their own hands as the sovereign. The anti-social is the person who works against the 
community, and he/she who shall be excluded to construct community, to cite Buur and Jensen 
(2004: 147) “the embodiment of evil, who must be exorcised to produce the moral community”. 
Building ‘community’ becomes an inherent part of the creation of security; the whistle proves to be 
a tool not only for alarming the anti-sociales, but also to be one of the concrete measures in 
establishing a sense of community.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
I have presented community policing (CP) as forming part of what I in Chapter Four have identified 
as the global security scape, and I have characterized it as a technique of power that has become a 
global blueprint for action in contemporary security governance. In looking at the translation of CP 
to Bolivia, I found that despite good intentions and great expertise, the British collaboration has not 
safeguarded an effective, democratic and responsive communitarian police force. I have found that 
their top-down ‘best-practices’-approach, building on global schemes of contemporary 
governmentality and responsibilization has proved difficult to follow for the Bolivian Police. This 
has established a space for action for communities in the grey zone between law and illegality, as I 
explored in Chapter Seven. In this Chapter I will discuss the implications of this in regards to the 
study of transfer of global ideas to local settings, as well as the reconfigured sovereignty of the state 
in contemporary society, and what this then tells us about state power today. Combining 
perspectives from other academic contributions to my own findings I set out to briefly broaden my 
study before I will conclude on my research question in the following chapter.  
 
Transferring Global Ideas to Local Contexts  
In Chapter Three I suggested that the global security scape forms part of broader transformations 
and global trends connected to neoliberal globalization. It has not been an aim of this study to 
discuss whether the neoliberal logic of self-governance, privatization and flexibility as a technology 
of governance in general has transcended Bolivian socialist politics of Evo Morales since 2006. 
However, based on by analysis and general knowledge to Bolivia, I suggest that neoliberal logics of 
governance do operate in Bolivia despite the current anti-neoliberal ideology of the government. 
Bolivia has been dominated by this ideology since the dictatorship (1971-1982) until 2006 and no 
doubt that some societal changes take more than a decade to change. Furthermore I understand 
Bolivia to be a part of a larger global context (e.g. by depending on foreign aid and through 
international trade) in which I perceive neoliberal technologies of governance to have gained solid 
ground. Cruikshank (1999) and Li (2007) suggest, in line with this, how self-governance and ‘help-
to-self-help’, e.g. found in international aid schemes and the global ‘will to empower’ or ‘will to 
improve’, should be seen as a way to govern the poor and not so much a solution to a problem. I 
suggest that this ‘will to improve’ derives from a type of knowledge production that is inserted in, 
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what Hönke and Müller (2012) call “modernization discourses justifying asymmetrical 
interventions” (p. 385).  
 
In regards to my study, I suggest that highlighting the great success of CP in rebuilding the police-
public relations after the violent conflict in North Ireland (Brit. Emb. 2010), the British Embassy 
positions ‘their policing model’ as a kind of safeguard against the “forces of darkness” (Brogden 
and Nijhar 2005: 4), and inscribe it in global blueprinted categories of modern democratic 
governance. In this sense, I argue in line with Hönke and Müller, it derives from a privileged 
position of having the dominant categories for understanding, describing and ‘improving’ the rest of 
the world. At least it appeared, in my case, to be difficult for the Bolivian Police force to reject – or 
transform - the implementation of CP when the British Embassy ‘insisted’ to ‘help’ (Cordero 
30/10/14).  
 
But as my analysis presents, the translation of global ideas of active citizenship and self-governance 
has at the same time come out to be something else in Bolivian local practice. In my study, the 
Bolivian community has not demonstrated to govern itself in alignment with the logics inherent in 
CP. Rather, parallel meaning systems seem to have found ground in the urban periphery. One 
aspect, apart from the ‘vernacularization’29 and new expression of community policing that I have 
studied, is the outspoken collective approach to security I have identified in Bolivia. This stands in 
contrast to the Western bias of the focus on the individual. Furthermore, the corporate security 
sector in Bolivia has not flourished as it has in other parts of the world (Abrahamsen and Williams 
2011), e.g. are private security guards not allowed to bear weapons (Ruiz 2/10/14). As a shortcut to 
my point, as I am about to end this thesis, I propose to see the current security governance in 
Bolivia in line with Sen and Pratten (2007: 5) who stress that vigilantism – in its polyvalent forms - 
both obeys logics of neoliberal globalization but also operates on its own cultural and historical 
logics.  
 
A study of the productivity of ‘failures’ 
I believe that going beyond the ‘programmers’ views and looking at de facto security governance it 
becomes possible to explore how eventual failures of security programmes (re)revitalize structures 
of indirect rule beyond a formal level. Such an approach could be what Hönke and Müller suggest !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 See e.g. Nils Bubandt, 2005, Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds, 
Security Dialogue 36: 275-296 
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as empirical postcolonial security research. Approaching security governance in this way, it 
becomes clear how perceived ‘failures’ can be productive. One pertinent example is how the 
subscription to the scheme of human rights produces counterproductive consequences locally. This 
showed to be the case in Lars Buur’s study of vigilantes in South Africa (Buur 2008). Here the 
concept of human rights became attached to ‘crime’ among community members, and detached 
from being a safeguard for victims. Instead, as human rights were presented as the moral building 
blocks of the ‘new’ South African state after apartheid, as a ‘One law for One nation’ (ibid.) they 
became fuel for criminal behaviour, Buur proposes (ibid.). In the same line, Goldstein (2012) 
discusses how “human rights advocates become demonized as enemies of security” (ibid: 206) by 
residents of marginal barrios in Bolivia’s Cochabamba district. What happened, he argues, was a 
human rights vernacularization in which the non-local ideals and language of human rights became 
locally reinterpreted and used in new ways (ibid.: 34).  
 
I saw a similar pattern in my study. By some of the barrio residents I have talked to, human rights 
are accused of making the policemen less tough and too sensible to violence, giving them too wide 
possibilities to complain about unjust treatment at their job. Instead the policemen should learn “the 
hard line” (Group interview, 29/10/14), so that they are not afraid of e.g. large groups of criminals 
or a couple of strokes (ibid.). Human rights are so to speak rejected as useful for providing security 
to the community. On the other hand, there was a tendency to justify extra-legal punishment with 
‘the right to security’. This is a topic that could be scrutinized much further, as it shows, in line with 
Chatterjee (2004: 40) the importance of political negotiation of rights by state authorities and 
communities on the margins of the state. !
New Claims to Sovereignty – Decrease of the State? 
My analysis has presented how barrio residents, in subtle ways, make claims to sovereignty as they 
manage security on their own, without collaborating with the police, and not always in accordance 
with the state logics of ‘security’ and ‘danger’. As the state becomes one among several sovereign 
bodies trying to assert itself upon the bodies of the excluded and those “not-yet-ready for 
citizenship” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 36), a central question seems prominent: does the power 
of the state then decrease?  
 
Based on my analysis, I suggest that the consequences of globalization and the fragmentation of 
state authority do not result in the disappearance of sovereign states. Rather, statehood and 
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sovereignty should be understood as practices that are constantly (re)produced, negotiated, and 
contested by various formal and informal actors at all levels. On that basis I have already suggested 
that the boundaries of the state have become productive grey zones, in which the power of the state 
is both contested but also re-constituted. Findings in a similar vein confirm that this is a more 
general character of statehood and sovereignty. Buur and Jensen (2004) suggest, as an example, in 
their study of policing in South Africa, that vigilantes, despite being a product of the ‘absence of the 
state’, “are involved in state-like performances […] and in a perpetual renegotiation of the 
boundaries between state and society” (ibid.: 144). Negotiating the boundaries of ‘the state’ is a 
way of making the state ‘visible’. In line with this, Risør (2010b) stresses how the Bolivian state 
first becomes ‘existing’ when the community members, informally, mobilize to manage insecurity. 
When they confront the state and demand services from the state, as well as when they take part in 
state-like activities, by also mimicking the state, the state becomes effective. The perceived absence 
of the state is, in that sense, also what makes the state present. The answer to the problem of the 
state often becomes ‘more state’, however in polyvalent manners, performed by a row of actors at 
times claiming to act in the name of the state. These constant negotiations of the boundaries of 
‘state’ and ‘non-state’, ‘law’ and ‘illegality’ result in the ongoing restructuring of power of the state. 
I believe these examples portray well how it can be possible to say that state authority can fragment 
without decreasing the power and the relevance of the state.  
 
The next question could then be: who decides over these different so-called ‘non-state’ actors? Are 
they really so ‘local’ as they might be portrayed as? From community organizations receiving 
development money from transnational NGOs, over private security companies led from London or 
Washington to local vigilante groups or gangs inspired by North American action movies are all 
embedded in (different) global security logics. It underlines that the global and the local ideas are 
intertwined, which could be a topic for much more discussion.  
 
As Appadurai reminds us, the scapes are perspectives with which we see the world. It explains why 
safety for some can signify insecurity for others. The ambivalence between law enforcement 
through police violence and lynch-violence is a good example here, as addressed by Goldstein 
(2012), Risør (2010b) and their colleagues. I have explored the same tension, however with a focus 
on the ‘every-day’ aspect of self-policing, as it takes place in an even more blurry grey zone(s) than 
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lynching vs. state police. In the next and Final Chapter I will summarize the findings of this thesis 
and conclude upon the research question. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The overall aim of this thesis has been to study how Community Policing (CP) from the global 
security scape is being translated and localized to the urban periphery of La Paz in Bolivia, and 
what this tells us about the twin aspects; translation of global blueprints to local contexts, and how 
this triggers new claims to sovereignty. Scrutinizing the translation of the global model of CP and 
its somewhat subversive transformation in Bolivia it has become clear how parallel or competing 
collective meaning systems appear, and constitute local security practices.  
 
As the barrio residents are organized in organisms defined by law, and are to be engaged in the 
security work through CP, the communities are being given a legitimate space to mobilize and do 
social control, and in that way reiterate state sovereignty. By codifying and delimiting the exercise 
of social control through laws and the CP model, the Bolivian state intents to recapture its control 
and legitimacy by means of decentralizing state control. This is in line with the change from 
‘centripetal’ to ‘centrifugal’ rule, as mentioned in Chapter Three and Four, implying a 
transformation from trying to regulate everything by centralizing power, to regulations by indirect 
government through the self-interest of the community. 
 
I have presented how the CP ‘contract’, which builds on this centrifugal type of governance, 
between residents and police meanwhile has not showed to be effective in practice, which I argue is 
a result of many factors. In this thesis I have focused on the institutional and cultural problems 
within the police, lack of mutual trust, as well as diverging ideas of ‘security’ between the state and 
the population. In the hillsides of La Paz a policeman represent the same uncertainty and insecurity 
as the criminal. The police, on the other hand, are also in a risky position. The sovereign authority 
they posses is not stable, rather, it is based on performativity and authority of the individual case, 
and therefore it can be turned around against them.  
 
In that context, the barrio residents have taken the space of manoeuvre they are given through the 
responsibilization mechanisms of CP to perform their own version of policing of the community. In 
this, they constantly oscillate between legality and illegality according to their own interpretation of 
‘order’ and ‘right’, sometimes subscribing to state law, other times beyond state law. Based on this, 
! 67!
I conclude that the barrio residents perform a subtle kind of sovereignty. ‘Blueprints’ in this regard 
have become something else in practice among local communities. 
 
This finding points to a conclusion that the top-down approach and the will to improve of the 
British policing experts and transfer assistants have not proved to be constructive in building up a 
democratic and collaborative police force in Bolivia. It confirms that transferring ideas and best 
practices from the global security scape to the local scape is a complex task. Adding the critical 
perspective presented in Chapter Eight, I argue that the privileged position of the British might have 
made it difficult to adapt it properly to the Bolivian context, as it was already embedded in an 
asymmetrical intervention. At least my analysis shows that the CP model has not safeguarded a 
sovereign police; rather, it has invoked new initiatives to perform sovereignty.  
 
The governmentality project of the state to make the citizens govern themselves through self-
interest to follow state logics has with other words not proved to be ‘complete’. It has created a 
community (we might call it a political community in line with Chatterjee) that works in the grey 
zone between trespassing the law e.g. by beating up suspects or criminals, and belonging to the 
lawful civil society of active citizens, in the modern democratic understanding as presented by 
Chatterjee. What is at stake for performers of sovereignty (states as well as vigilantes) is a constant 
negotiation of right(s) and wrong, ‘order’ and ‘danger’. The worldview that anyone of us constructs 
depends on who we are and what scapes we look at and from; therefore there will be multiple ways 
of imagining a safe barrio, as well as diverging interpretations of how to establish ‘security’. As 
new claims to sovereignty are triggered, the authority of the state becomes fragmented, but does not 
necessarily decrease. I have conceptualized self-policing as a performance of sovereignty, defined 
as a socially constructed source of power that is reproduced through daily practices and repetitious 
public performances and is based on both the threat and use of violence. In this dissertation I have 
underlined how self-policing, as one expression of vigilantism, substitutes the state in its perceived 
absence, and in this way also becomes part of the permanent formation of the state. Social 
contestations of self-policing both bolster and challenge state authority, as they interfere with and 
become expressions of claims to sovereignty.  
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